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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Utah Code Annotated §63-46B-16 confers jurisdiction upon the Supreme 
Court or other appellate courts designated by statute to review all final agency 
actions resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings. Utah Code Annotated 
§78-2a-3(2)(a) grants jurisdiction to the Utah Court of Appeals to review the final 
orders and decrees of state and local agencies. 
NATURE OF PROCEEDING 
This appeal is from the final decision of the Utah Personnel Review Board, 
an administrative agency of the State of Utah. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
The issues presented on appeal are as follows: 
1. May the Personnel Review Board substitute it's own judgment for that 
of a department head, in a termination matter, when the department head has not 
abused his discretion in imposing discipline? 
2. May the Personnel Review Board overturn the penalty of termination 
imposed by a department head, when the penalty does not "shock one's sense of 
fairness" and is not an "abuse of discretion"? 
3. May the Personnel Review Board ignore the limitations on penalty 
provided for by rule as they relate to the departments of State Government and 
impose its own penalty greater than what agency's may impose and which itself 
seems excessive and an abuse of the Board's discretion? 
4. Is it reversible error for the Personnel Review Board to rely on 
irrelevant evidence and issues to reach its own legal conclusion as justification to 
substitute a different penalty for that imposed by the department head? 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 
The statutes, rules and cases believed by appellant to be dispositive 
of the issues in appellant's favor are as follows: 
STATUTES: 
Utah Code Annotated § 67-19-18, 1953 as Amended 
Utah Code Annotated § 67-19-20, 1953 as Amended 
Utah Code Annotated § 67-19-21, 1953 as Amended 
Utah Code Annotated § 67-19-25, 1953 as Amended 
ADMINISTRATIVE RULES: 
Utah Administrative Code, R20-11-1, (1987-1988) 
Utah Administrative Code, R20-11-2, (1987-1988) 
Utah Administrative Code, R665-1-25 (1987-1988) 
Utah Administrative Code, R665-1-26 (1987-1988) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
CASE NATURE. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION 
After investigation and hearings provided by the Utah Department of 
Corrections, Utah State Prison, Paul Sucher was terminated from employment by 
Gary Deland, Executive Director of the Department of Corrections. Mr. Sucher 
appealed the decision of termination to the Personnel Review Board. A hearing 
officer held an evidentiary hearing and issued a decision under date of January 12, 
1988 sustaining the decision of the department head, Mr. Deland. 
Mr. Sucher appealed the hearing officer's decision sustaining the 
department head to the Personnel Review Board. The Board adopted all Findings 
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of Fact and Conclusions of Law of the hearing officer, but overturned the decision 
of termination and imposed boath a suspension without pay or benefit's of 
approximately 15 months and demotion, ordering reinstatement of Mr. Sucher as 
of December 20, 1988. 
The Department of Corrections, Utah State Prison appeals the 
decision of reinstatement and modification of the penalty. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Seeing that there are several volumes of the hearing transcript, the various 
citations will be designated in abbreviated form. For example, Volume 2, page 25 
will be cited as (2:25) or Volume 4, pages 30-35 will be cited as (4:30-35), etc. 
Paul S. Sucher was a career service employee of The Utah Department of 
Corrections. He was hired as a Corrections Officer on October 28, 1976. He held 
peace officer status as part of his employment as a Corrections Officer. He was 
appointed to the rank of Lieutenant, a supervisory position, on January 1, 1984. 
(4:3) His overall performance evaluation was above standard during his 
employment. (3:168) 
He received a Formal Warning letter, dated May 18, 1989, advising him that 
his performance as shift leader during an escape attempt on February 3, 1987, 
was unsatisfactory. (1:38-39). The letter was to be considered in his next 
performance rating. 
On June 19, 1987, Inmate Greg Loya plugged the toilet and flooded 
his cell in the Young Adult Correctional Facility, Starr 1. When his cell was opened, 
Loya walked out of his cell and exited the Starr 1 facility (1:73). At this time 
Captain Bona rang the signal for all inmates to return to their housing units (1:132, 
134). Loya approached Central Control where he was met by Captain Bona, Lt. 
Sucher, and Officers White, Blocker and Moody. 
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Sucher was ordered to place handcuffs on Loya. He did so with little 
difficulty (3:129). Loya was then ordered back to his cell. He became extremely 
agitated. He was placed in leg irons after a struggle (3:131). Officers Moody and 
Sucher were kicked during the struggle (3:131). Loya continued to refuse to return 
to his cell after he had been restrained by handcuffs and leg irons (1:77). He was 
then carried by four officers, one on each limb (1:79). Sucher was holding Loya's 
right leg (1:78). After moving a short distance, Loya moved to a sitting position 
and spat in Sucher's face (1:80, 2:132). Sucher retaliated by striking Loya in the 
mouth as Loya re-gathered spit (1:81). Loya's mouth was bleeding after Sucher's 
blow (1:167). Sucher prepared to strike a second time. Officer White yelled for 
him to stop, which he did (1:81, 82). Loya then spit a second time in Sucher's face 
(1:114). Sucher released Loya's leg and left to wash his face. As he left he 
shouted something to the effect he was going to charge Loya with assault with a 
deadly weapon (3:132). Loya was turned face down to prevent further spitting. 
After being carried for a short distance, he was allowed to walk and return to his 
cell without further incident (1:82). 
Since the appointment on July 1, 1985, of Gary W. DeLand as 
Executive Director of the Department of Corrections, a Department of Corrections 
Manual of Policy and Procedures has been adopted and the policy and procedural 
rules have been strictly enforced (1:95, 249-50, 3:3-13). Sucher had been issued 
a copy of the Manual of Policy and Procedures (2;19-20). He had also attended at 
least one training session on the use of force (2:60). 
On July 22 and 27, 1987, an administrative hearing was conducted by 
Utah Department of Corrections Administrative Law Judge Toby Jacquez. Judge 
Jacquez submitted his recommendation to the Executive Director on August 17, 
1987. Based on the facts he found and a previous disciplinary case, he 
recommended punishment ranging from a demotion and thirty days off to 
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termination. He stated that if Sucher was not terminated, he should be referred for 
counseling and transferred to a duty station limiting interaction with offenders. His 
recommendations were forwarded to the Director of Institutional Operations, David 
Franchina, and to Warden Jeff Galli. 
Director Franchina and Warden Galli recommended Sucher be 
terminated. Sucher appealed to the Executive Director. On September 1, 1987, 
Sucher and Utah Public Employees representative Ray Taylor appeared to argue 
for sanctions less than termination. On September 9, 1987, Mr. Taylor was given 
an opportunity to review a draft of the Final Order. On September 11, 1987, Mr. 
Taylor indicated the Final Order should be issued. On September 14, 1987, the 
Final Order was issued, terminating Mr. Sucher's employment. 
Following his termination, Mr. Sucher appealed to the Personnel 
Review Board. A hearing was held on November 24, 25, 30, and December 4, 
1987 before H. Wright Volker, a Hearing Officer of the Personnel Review Board. 
On January 8, 1988, he issued his decision. He found substantial evidence 
establishing Sucher committed the acts complained of. He further found the 
mitigating circumstances did not present a sound basis for modifying the decision 
to terminate Mr. Sucher. (Hearing Officer Decision) 
Mr. Sucher appealed that the decision to Personnel Review Board. 
The Board convened on December 13, 1988 for an appellate review. It denied 
Sucher's motion to consider new evidence. It also determined the Step 5 (Mr. 
Volker's) findings of fact to be accurate and to have been correctly applied to the 
law. (PRB Decision, p.12) The Board overturned the termination but imposed a 15 
month suspension without pay, benefits and seniority, ordered a demotion and 
ordered Sucher's reinstatement. The Department of Corrections appeals the 
Board's decision. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
POINT I: The role of the Personnel Review Board (Board) is to be an 
//appellate,/ review body. It is to determine whether there is substantial evidence 
presented by the department head to justify the disciplinary action taken. The 
Board is not authorized to substitute its judgment as to what it would have done 
had it been the department head. Because the Board did impose its own sanction 
by substituting its judgment, it abused its authority and discretion. 
POINT II: The penalty imposed by the department head neither ''shocks 
one's sense of fairness" nor can be considered an abuse of discretion. As such, 
there was no basis for the Board to overturn the termination and impose its own 
extensive penalty which included reinstatement. 
POINT III: The Board cannot create or invent penalties that do not exist in 
law or rule. It also cannot impose a penalty greater than what is authorized for 
department heads to impose. Agencies are limited to 30 calendar day 
suspensions, yet the Board imposed a 15 month suspension, clearly outside its 
scope of authority and not in accordance with any rule or statute. This constitutes 
an abuse of discretion. 
POINT IV: The Board relied on the lack of AIDS training as the basis to 
modify the punishment. This was reversible error since there was never any 
showing that such training was relevant to Suchers unwarranted use of "excessive 
force," "retaliation," and inappropriate behavior. The Board cited no evidence or 
portion of the record that en sustain such a reversal of the hearing officer "as a 
matter of law." Such action of the board is arbitrary and an abuse of its discretion. 
There was simply no evidence in the record to support its unwarranted imposition 
of its own philosophical position. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
IT WAS ERROR FOR THE PERSONNEL 
REVIEW BOARD TO SUBSTITUTE ITS 
JUDGMENT FOR THAT OF THE DEPARTMENT 
OF CORRECTIONS. THE BOARD'S ROLE IS TO 
DETERMINE WHETHER THERE IS SUBSTANTIAL 
EVIDENCE TO SUSTAIN THE DEPARTMENT 
A. 
THE BOARD AND ITS HEARING 
OFFICERS ACT AS APPELLATE 
BODIES TO DETERMINE IF 
AGENCY ACTION IS SUSTAINED 
BY THE FACTS. 
The Personnel Review Board (Board) in rendering its decision 
substituted its judgment for that of the agency in contravention to both its role and 
its authority. The Board not only rejected the agency's decision, but relied on an 
irrelevant reading of its role in these matters. As such, this Court must reverse the 
Board as a matter of law. 
Utah Code Annotated §67-19-18 sets forth clearly the authority to 
impose the penalty of termination for "just cause." The responsibility for not only 
that determination, but the act of termination rests solely with the department head 
of the employing department. §67-19-18(3)(d) specifically states: "Following the 
hearing an employee may be dismissed or demoted if the department head finds 
adequate cause or reason" (Emphasis added). Section 18(1) further provides that 
the director of the Department of Human Resource Management (DHRM) "shall" 
promulgate rules governing the procedural requirements. These rules are found in 
the State of Utah Personnel Management Rules at R20-11-1 et. s_e_g. These rules 
clearly state, as per Rule R20-11 -2.(2), that it is the department head that 
determines whether there is cause and makes the termination decision. 
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Counsel can find no statutory authority empowering the Board or its 
hearing officer to make the decision to terminate or discipline employees. The 
Board has limited jurisdiction - to act as an appellate body to "review" the actions 
taken by management. Utah Code Annotated §67-19-20(5)(a) and (b) set forth the 
responsibilities of the Board as follows: 
(a) to serve as a quasi-judicial body to hear appeals 
from employees directly affected by actions taken under 
authority granted by this chapter to the director or to 
agencies on matters pertaining to...dismissals...and 
disciplinary actions; 
(b) to serve as the final administrative appeal body... 
(Emphasis added) 
If appealed, a matter goes before a hearing officer who conducts an 
evidentiary hearing to determine whether there is "substantial evidence" to sustain 
management's decision. The transcript of the proceedings along with the exhibits 
entered into evidence constitute the "record of the hearing." (See §67-19-
25(5)(c)). 
It is clear that what is being reviewed by the Board hearing officer, 
then, is the agency decision. 
B 
HEARING OFFICERS AND THE BOARD 
ARE ONLY EMPOWERED TO TAKE AND 
REVIEW EVIDENCE TO DETERMINE 
WHETHER SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE EXISTS 
TO SUPPORT THE ACTION TAKEN 
BY MANAGEMENT. 
According to Utah Code Annotated §67-19-25(d)(i): 'The state has 
the burden of proof in all appeals resulting from dismissals..." In essence, the 
hearing officer and ultimately the Board determine whether the state has met the 
burden of proof to sustain the agency action. 
Rule R665-1 -25.3.2 of the Board rules clearly identifies the purpose 
for evidentiary hearings: ''An evidentiary proceeding is intended solely for the 
purpose of receiving evidence which either refutes or substantiates specific claims 
or charges." 
Rule R665-25.4 further clarifies the purpose: 
An evidentiary/Step 5 hearing shall be a new hearing on 
the record...The Hearing Officer shall give latitude and 
deference to an agency's prior decision when the latter 
was supported by the findings of fact based on the 
evidence. (Emphasis added) 
Rule R665-25-6 establishes the standard of proof for all hearings as 
follows: 
"In all hearings the standard of proof (i.e., quantum of 
proof or evidentiary standard) is the substantial evidence 
standard." (Emphasis added). 
The Nebraska Supreme Court in Monie v. State Personnel Board, 424 
N.W.2d 874 (Neb. 1988) dealt with this exact issue. The District Court had 
overturned an agency's decision to terminate an employee with substantially more 
"mitigating" factors in his favor than The Utah Board found for Sucher. The 
Nebraska Court reinstated the termination by clearly chiding The Court for not 
applying the proper scope of review of The Personnel Board (the equivalent of the 
PRB). The Court said: 
The scope of review of the Personnel Board 
is to decide whether the decision to terminate 
was made in good faith and for cause, and to 
insure that the agency head followed proper 
procedures under state personnel and/or agency 
rules and regulations, labor agreements, or 
relevant statutes. 
Evidence is permitted for this purpose and not to allow the board to 
establish policy or interpose its own judgment. Simply put, if there is "substantial 
evidence", the decision of the department head must be sustained. If substantial 
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evidence does not exist, the department head has abused his discretion and the 
decision should be overturned. 
U.C.A. §67-19-18(1) sets forth the grounds upon which termination 
may be made. Counsel concedes that not every action taken by employees that 
fits into one of the enumerated categories is deserving of termination. It is certainly 
dependent on the circumstances. Lesser actions deserve lesser punishment, 
hence, Rule R20-11-1.(4) provides for written reprimands, suspensions, demotions 
as well as terminations. 
C 
THE DEPARTMENT HEADS AND NOT 
THE BOARD, ITS HEARING OFFICERS 
OR THE COURTS ARE THE BODIES TO 
MAKE THE DECISION ON DISCIPLINE. 
THAT IS APPROPRIATELY LEFT TO 
THE AGENCY HEADS. 
The decision of what action to take must be made by those who are 
in charge of the departments where inappropriate conduct happens. It is the 
department heads that have been appointed and given this responsibility. The 
Board or its hearing officers have no such authority. 
An early Utah case, Fowler v. Gillman, 76 Utah 414, 290 P. 358 (Utah 
1930), clearly establishes that a sheriff (department head) is the one to make the 
decision to dismiss a deputy where the deputy "has been guilty of misconduct..." 
Appellant Department of Corrections simply maintains the same posture: the 
misconduct and gravity of it must be determined by the presiding officer of the 
agency - the department head. Unless there is an abuse of discretion, the 
department head must be given the latitude to make the "tough" decisions 
necessary to run and control his agency. 
The controlling Utah case in this area is Matter of Discharge of Jones, 
720 P.2d 1356 (Utah 1986). A deputy sheriff who misused his position through 
deception to obtain property of an arrested party was terminated. The Merit 
Commission reinstated the deputy. The Sheriff appealed and the Supreme Court 
eventually reinstated the dismissal: 
The sheriff must manage and direct his deputies, and is 
in the best position to know whether their actions merit 
discipline. If the Merit Commission finds upon review that 
the facts support the charges against the deputy, then it 
must affirm the sheriff's disciplinary action, unless it finds 
the sanction so clearly disproportionate to the charges as 
to amount to an abuse of the sheriff's discretion. 
(Emphasis Added) 
Utah is not the only jurisdiction that has adopted this position. The 
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals of Louisiana in City of Kenner v. Pritchett, 432 So.2d 
971 (La.App.5 Cir. 1983) stated: 
A chief of police, charged with the operation of running 
his department, must do so to the best of his ability. He 
has the discretion to take disciplinary actions when there 
exists sufficient cause for such action and, accordingly, 
is answerable for departmental actions...Because an 
officer is the first to be terminated for violation of 
departmental rules does not alone constitute bad faith. 
To hold that the appointing authority acted in bad faith 
would in effect tie the hands of the chief of police (or 
supervisor) in such matters. 
D 
THE BOARD, HEARING OFFICERS AND 
COURTS ARE NOT TO IMPOSE THEIR JUDGMENTS 
FOR THOSE OF THE AGENCY HEADS. TO 
DO SO IS REVERSIBLE ERROR. 
In Graybill v. United States Postal Service, 782 F.2d 1567 (Fed. Cir. 
1986) the court ruled that "Our function is not to conduct a de novo review of 
agency disciplinary proceedings in order to determine what penalty we might have 
imposed..." Again, the Federal Circuit in Beard v. General Services Administration, 
801 F.2d 1318 (Fed.Cir. 1986) stated that: "We have frequently recognized in 
cases arising under the Civil Service Reform Act that '[determination of an 
appropriate penalty is a matter committed primarily to the sound discretion of the 
employing agency"' (citation omitted) 
The leading Utah case on point is Xanthos v. Board of Adjustment of 
Salt Lake City, 685 P 2d 1032 (Utah 1984) In this case, The Board entered a 
decision after a hearing where no formal record or transcript was kept On appeal, 
evidence was taken so as to determine what the facts were upon which the Board 
relied. The District Court reversed The Board holding that in a "plenary' action it 
had the same power as The Board — in essence, could render a decision as if it 
were the Board The Supreme Court reversed The District Court and sustained 
The Board's decision In clear and specific language, The Court held that appellate 
review bodies are not to substitute their judgment for that of the agencies who are 
the bodies by law to make the decisions The Court said 
In the case at hand, the district judge 
undertook to weigh anew the underlying factual 
considerations While there may have been some 
evidence in the record to support the trial 
judge's findings, it was not his prerogative to 
weigh the evidence anew His role was limited 
to determining whether there was evidence in the 
record to support the Board of Adjustment's 
action The judge went beyond this role and 
decided the case according to his notion of 
what was in the best interests of the citizens 
of Salt Lake City...it does not matter whether the 
judge agrees or disagrees with the rationale 
of the Board or the policy grounds upon which 
a decision is based. It does not he within 
the prerogative of the trial court to substitute 
its judgment for that of the Board where the 
record discloses a reasonable basis for the 
Board's decision. (Emphasis added) 
The Board did substitute its judgment in contravention to this clear 
statement from The Court. It did so by imposing its belief that AIDS training 
should be given in corrections and that the lack of it justified overturning the 
Department's decision. Just as The District Court judge, above, wanted to 
determine what Salt Lake City should do, the Board wanted to do so regarding 
AIDS training. Both are improper uses of appellate authority. 
Other jurisdictions have concurred in this position. In DeGroot v. 
Arizona Racing Commission, 686 P.2d 1301 (Ariz.App. 1984), the Court of Appeals 
stated: "A trial court may not function as a 'super agency' and substitute its own 
judgment for that of the agency where factual questions and agency expertise is 
involved." 
Again, the Washington Court of Appeals in Clark v. Central Kitsap 
School District, 38 Wash.App. 560, 686 P.2d 514 (Wash.App. 1984) held: 
In reaching this conclusion the court looked carefully at 
the statutes and found that they vest no discretion in the 
trial court insofar as appropriate sanction is concerned, 
once sufficient cause for discharge is found. The 
statutes do not reflect a legislative intent to make the 
superior courts a super school board in the area of 
retention or discharge of teachers...' 
...Once sufficient cause for discharge has been found, 
the question of whether discharge is appropriate is a 
policy decision...Such matters involve policy 
considerations within the exclusive purview of the board, 
not the trial court or jury. Neither judge nor jury is entitled 
to usurp the powers and authority of the duly elected 
board members once the board has satisfied the laws 
respecting discharge. (Emphasis added) 
In a leading case from Pennsylvania, O'Gorman's Appeal',409 Pa. 571, 
187 A.2d 581 (Pa. 1963), the court stated: 
What constitutes ample Oust] cause for removal...must 
necessarily be largely a matter of discretion on the part 
of the head of the department... 
...All the law requires is that the cause be not religious 
or political, but concerned solely with the inefficiency, 
delinquency or misconduct of the employee. A wide 
latitude must be left to the superior officer - in fact a 
discretion conditioned on its exercise in good faith and 
not as a screen for some reason not based upon the 
fitness of the employee to fill the position. (Emphasis 
added) 
In discussing this role of the agency, the United States Supreme 
Court had occasion to rule on the role of the National Labor Relation Board in 
applying the "substantial evidence" standard as it related to personnel actions, 
Universal Camera Corp v. NLRB 340 U.S. 474 (1951): 
To be sure, the requirement for canvassing 'the whole 
recording order to ascertain substantiality does not 
furnish a calculus of value by which [the Board]...can 
assess the evidence. Nor was it intended to negative the 
function of...agencies presumably equipped or informed 
by experience to deal with a specialized field of 
knowledge, whose findings in that field carry the authority 
of an expertise which [the Board does]...not possess and 
therefore must respect. Nor does it mean that even as to 
matters not requiring expertise [the Board]...may displace 
the [agency's],..choice between two fairly conflicting 
views, even though the [Board]...would justifiably have 
made a different choice...Congress has merely made it 
clear that [the Board]... is not precluded from setting 
aside [an agency]...decision when it cannot 
conscientiously find that the evidence supporting that 
decision is substantial, when viewed in the light that the 
record in its entirety furnishes, including the body of 
evidence opposed to the [agency's]...view (Emphasis 
added). 
The Federal Merit System Protection Board has also dealt with this 
subject in the case Parker v. Defense Logistics Agency, 1 MSPB 489 (1980): 
Unlike the preponderance standard, which requires 
evidence that a reasonable person would accept as 
sufficient to find a contested fact more probably true 
than untrue, the substantial evidence standard requires 
only evidence of such quality and weight that reasonable 
and fair-minded persons in exercising impartial judgment 
might reach different conclusions. This standard 
precludes the Board's presiding official from substituting 
his or her own judgment from that of the agency. It 
obliges the presiding official to determine not only 
whether, in light of all relevant and credible evidence 
before the Board, a reasonable person could agree with 
the agency's decision (even though other reasonable 
persons including the presiding official might disagree 
with that decision). (Emphasis added) 
The Utah Supreme Court in Utah State Road Commission v. Steele 
Ranch, 535 P.2d 888 (Utah 1975) also addressed the issue that under this 
standard, (substantial evidence), all that is needed to sustain the decision -
[penalty] - is some credible evidence. The Court said: 
Allowance should be made for the fact that there is a 
comparatively wide orbit through which reasonable minds 
may swing; and that what may be considered reasonable 
in the broad sense need not necessarily fit into the exact 
pattern of our own thought...the requirement is that the 
evidence must be sufficient in amount and credibility 
that, when considered in connection with the other 
evidence and circumstances shown in the case, would 
justify some, but not necessarily all, reasonable minds 
acting fairly thereon, to believe it to be the truth. 
The hearing officer determines what the facts are and whether there 
is "substantial evidence" to sustain the department head. The Board thus becomes 
purely an "appellate body" just as the courts do. The Board cannot substitute its 
judgment just as the courts cannot substitute their judgment. If the Board does so, 
or issues a decision that either misinterprets its role or the legal conclusions 
reached, it is incumbent on the Courts to correct that error and impose the 
decision that was imposed by the agency. 
E 
THE BOARD DID SUBSTITUTE ITS JUDGEMENT. 
IT PLACED ITSELF IN THE ROLE OF A 
"SUPER AGENCY," APPLIED THE WRONG 
STANDARD FOR DETERMINING PENALTY 
AND USURPED THE AUTHORITY OF THE 
DEPARTMENT HEAD, ALL IN CONTRAVENTION 
TO BOTH ITS AUTHORITY AND ROLE. 
In the Board's "FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS", Part A., the Board 
adopted the factual findings of its hearing officer and found no error in any of 
them, adopting them as the Board's own: 'The Step 5 findings of facts are 
determined to be accurate and to have been correctly applied to the law." 
(Emphasis added). The Board then went on to make several other significant 
findings: 
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B.1. While Sucher had a "subjective fear of aide, "We 
further find, however, that Sucher was not singularly 
motivated by an interest in his self defense as he 
claimed, but that he lunged forward, swung at, and hit 
Loya in the mouth area with his fist as a retaliatory act 
for having been spit upon by the inmate." 
B.3. "Sucher's conduct of striking Loya in the mouth, in 
light of the totality of the circumstances, was not 
appropriate or reasonable, but rather his act of punching 
Loya constituted excessive force. 
B.4. "The evidentiary examiner's conclusion and ruling 
was neither arbitrary nor capricious..." 
B.5. "Appellant asserted that his act of striking Loya 
subsequent to being spit upon was one of self defense. 
We do not agree...Sucher committed an act of retaliation 
for having been spit upon in the facial area by 
Loya...Sucher's reliance upon a self defense claim is 
found to have been unreasonable, without merit, and 
wholly inappropriate as a response." (Emphasis added in 
all sections) 
The Utah Supreme Court, in Discharge of Jones, supra, specifically 
held that the standard in Utah is: 
If the Merit Commission [Personnel Review Board] finds 
upon review that the facts support the charges against 
the deputy [Sucher], then it must affirm the sheriff's 
disciplinary action, unless it finds the sanction so clearly 
disproportionate to the charges as to amount to an 
abuse of the sheriff's discretion. (Emphasis added). 
The Board did not follow this standard, but applied its own and 
thereby substituted its judgment for that of the department head and in 
contravention to its role as an appellate body. The Board held that because there 
had not been AIDs training, the punishment was "excessive" even though the 
Board declared the acts of Sucher "retaliatory," "excessive force," and any claim 
for self defense [i.e. fear of aids] as "unreasonable, without merit, and wholly 
inappropriate as a response," and that the hearing officer's ruling was not 
"arbitrary nor capricious." "Excessive" is not necessarily equivalent to "abuse of 
discretion" as required by Jones. It can be, but for the Board to simply rely on 
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what it considers "excessive" is itself an abuse of the Board's authority. A great 
danger is created by establishing the Board as a "super agency." Punishments 
are then always subject to the whim of the Board. Unless an agency's decision is 
clearly an "abuse of discretion" [discussed in the next argument], the Board has no 
right or authority to sit in judgment of what it considers as "excessive" in 
comparison to what the agency feels is proper. 
The Utah Supreme Court in Salt Lake City Corporation v. Department 
of Employment Security, 657 P.2d 1312 (Utah 1982) specifically held that the 
courts [here the Board really is acting as a court ("quasi-judicial body") to hear 
appeals] not substitute their judgment for that of the agency" 
...where the language of a statute indicates 
a legislative intention to commit broad 
discretion to an agency to effectuate the 
purposes of the legislative scheme, we will 
not substitute our judgment for that of the 
agency as long as the commission's 
interpretation has 'warrant in the record' 
and a 'reasonable basis in the law'. 
There is no question that the Department heads have been given a 
broad grant of authority and the discretion to determine discipline. As the Court 
stated, as long as there is a "reasonable basis in law" and sufficient "warrant in 
the record" the courts [Board] is not at liberty to substitute its judgment for that of 
the agency head. 
The California Supreme Court in Nightingale v. State Personnel Board, 
102 Cal.Rptr. 758, 498 P.2d 1006 (Cal 1972) held that "...it is well settled that in 
reviewing the penalty imposed by an administrative body [personnel action], neither 
a trial court nor an appellate court is free to substitute its own discretion as to the 
matter." 
An Arizona Court of Appeals stated in Webster v. State Board of 
Regents, 599 P.2d 816 (Ariz. App. 1979) that: 
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The trial judge may not merely substitute his 
judgment for that of the administrative 
agency involved. Instead, before a reversal 
is justified, the trial court must find that 
the agency has acted arbitrarily, capriciously. 
or has abused it discretion...[citation omitted] 
In the resolution of factual issues, this stand-
ard requires a determination of whether there 
was substantial evidence to support the agency's 
decision. 
Brown v. Sexner, 85 lll.App.3d 139, 405 N.E.2d 1082 (III.App. 1980) 
found that court discussing the role of a police agency [which the Department of 
Corrections is]: 
Because there is no statutory definition of cause, 
whether a charge is sufficient cause for discharge is 
generally for the agency to determine...A police board 
[department head] has considerable latitude in 
determining what constitutes cause for discharge and its 
decision will not be reversed unless its finding is 
unrelated to the requirements of the service or so trivial 
as to be unreasonable. 
The Eastern District for California in Diaz v. U.S. Postal Service, 658 
F.Supp. 484 (E.D.Cal. 1987) stated in a termination case: 
Discretion in disciplinary matters has long been held to 
rest with the administrative agency, and the Court may 
not reweigh the evidence or substitute its own judgment 
for that of an agency determination adequately 
supported...[citations omitted]. 
While many others could be cited, there is clear support that the 
Board, sitting in the position of a reviewing appellate body, must sustain the 
decision of the agency, just like the hearing officers must do if there is substantial 
evidence, regardless of whether the Board disagrees with that decision. 
It is quite clear that the Board does not like the fact that the 
Department of Corrections had not done training in AIDS prevention and/or dealing 
with issues regarding this disease. Finding B.2. specifically "chides" the 
Department for failing to provide training before the incident stating that "the 
Agency did not show that proper training, orientation, or educational instruction 
regarding AIDS in a custodial setting had been offered." The Board, however, 
specifically found that Sucher's subjective fears of AIDS regarding spitting were 
"misguided as well as unreasonable (PRB Decision, P.14) Sucher's acts were 
"retaliatory" for being spit upon, were "excessive force" unjustified in any manner 
and form, were not "self defense" and his claims were "unreasonable, without 
merit, and wholly inappropriate as a response." 
Nowhere in the Board's entire opinion is there any claim, finding or 
conclusion of the Board that such training would have made any difference in 
"retaliatory strikes," "excessive force," or "offensive" (versus self defense) actions 
involving Loya, a totally shackled and restrained inmate. It is obvious, as a matter 
of law, that the Board wanted the Department to institute AIDS training. It made a 
policy decision - something the Utah Supreme Court in Xanthos, supra, totally 
rejected as being inappropriate. The Board simply imposed its own penalty to 
"send the message" to the Department that it had better "shape up" and provide 
AIDS training. This is clearly an abuse of discretion on the part of the Board. To 
sustain this action of the Board would in essence be saying that any time the 
Board does not like a policy of an agency or wants to change the policy, it simply 
needs to overturn a discipline because the agency didn't do what the Board likes 
or that no matter what an employee does, if the employee can establish that some 
training could have been given, but wasn't, the "totality" of the circumstances 
would not justify termination. This is an improper usurption of authority. This 
expressed position of the Board is not only wrong, but is an intrusion into the role 
of the agencies. It is our improper usurption of authority. 
The fact that AIDS is a disease that is currently receiving headlines in 
the news media is not justification to throw out justifiable grounds simply because 
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the Board desired to send a message and felt that had it been the department 
head it would have done something different. There is no justification in the record. 
As a matter of law, this Court must correct the error of the Board. 
Upon review of the agency decision, the hearing officer found substantial evidence 
to support the decision of termination. He correctly determined his role to review 
that action in light of seeing whether the evidence supported the action. The Board 
on the other hand is the entity that created error in substituting its judgment for 
that of the agency, applying the wrong standard, relying on irrelevant information, 
and exceeding its jurisdiction in issuing a suspension not authorized or permitted 
by law or rule. 
POINT II 
THE PENALTY WAS A REASONABLE PENALTY 
AND NEITHER "SHOCKS ONE'S SENSE OF FAIRNESS" 
NOR CAN BE CONSIDERED AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION. 
AS SUCH, THE BOARD'S OVERTURNING OF THE 
DECISION OF THE DEPARTMENT HEAD AND IMPOSING 
A FIFTEEN MONTH SUSPENSION IN LIEU OF 
TERMINATION IS ERROR AS A MATTER OF LAW 
AND MUST BE OVERTURNED BY THIS COURT. 
A 
THE STANDARD IS A HIGH 
STANDARD REQUIRING THAT 
ACTIONS BE SO VIOLATIVE OF 
REASON AS TO BE ABUSIVE. 
The reasonableness of the action taken by the department head 
centers on the fact that we are dealing with a segment of the state workforce that 
is expected and required to live by a higher standard than other "non-law 
enforcement" employees. Matter of Jones, supra, clearly points this out wherein 
the Supreme Court cites the Law Enforcement Code of Ethics at length. That Code 
contains provisions and requirements every law enforcement officer takes upon 
him/herself when entering service. To Counsel's knowledge no other state 
employees take upon them such an all encompassing "code of ethics." As such, 
the standard is distinctly higher for those who so serve. Among the important 
parts of that code that are applicable to this matter are the following [the entire 
code is contained in the appendix]: 
...my fundamental duty is to serve mankind: to 
safeguard lives and property: 
/ will...develop self-restraint:...I will be exemplary in 
obeying the laws of the land and the regulations of my 
department... 
I will never act officiously or permit personal feelings, 
prejudices, animosities or friendship to influence my 
decisions... never employing unnecessary force or 
violence... 
/ recognize the badge of my office as a symbol of public 
faith, and I accept it as a public trust to be held so long 
as I am true to the ethics of the police service... 
(Emphasis added) 
Certainly, this ethics code, as supported and emphasized by the Utah 
Supreme Court, places a high standard on those assigned in this very important 
area of public trust. The case of Newcomer v. Civil Service Commission of 
Fairchance Borough, 515 A.2d 108 (Pa.CmwIth. 1986) summarizes this position as 
follows: 
This Court has held that the conduct of law enforcement 
personnel must be "above reproach." Law enforcement 
officers are properly required to adhere to demanding 
standards which are higher than those applied to many 
other professions. (Emphasis added) 
It is this role of Mr. Sucher and other law enforcement officers that 
must be taken into consideration when the "reasonableness" of the punishment is 
assessed. It is this role that has led courts throughout the country to hold actions 
of "excessive force" and "hitting shackled inmates" as reasonable, just grounds to 
sustain terminations. For such disciplinary measures, the agency "has the primary 
responsibility and discretion for determining whether or not and how a police 
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officer should be disciplined," Newcomer, id. It is that discretion that is sustained 
as long as the discipline neither "shocks one's sense of fairness," is not "arbitrary 
or capricious," or is not an "abuse of discretion " 
New York has been on the leading edge in helping to focus on 
whether punishments should be overturned or modified A New York court, in 
discussing this issue offered the following caution in O'Shea v. Martin, 34 Misc 2d 
987, 230 N Y.S.2d 935 (1962). The court stated 
...a judicial review of the penalty imposed must be 
exercised with great caution The respondents have, to a 
large degree, the responsibility for the maintenance of 
proper discipline of the members of the police force and 
their maintenance of a sense of obligation to the 
positions they hold These are heavy responsibilities and 
when it appears, as here, that the respondents acted in 
good faith, had a reasonable basis for the action taken, it 
should not and will not be disturbed by this court 
(Emphasis added) 
One of the leading cases that establishes the standard as to what is 
"a reasonable basis" is the case Pell v. Board of Education, 34 N Y.2d 222, 356 
N.Y.S.2d 833 (N Y.Ct App. 1974): 
But, where the finding of guilt is confirmed and 
punishment has been imposed, the test is whether such 
punishment is "so disproportionate to the offense, in the 
light of all the circumstances, as to be shocking to one's 
sense of fairness". (Emphasis added) 
The court, realizing that this terminology leaves a lot to be desired, 
expounded on its interpretation: 
Of course, terminology like "shocking to one's sense of 
fairness" reflects a purely subjective response to the 
situation presented and is hardly satisfactory. Yet its 
usage has persisted for many years and through many 
cases. Obviously, such language reflects difficulty in 
articulating an objective standard. At this time, it may be 
ventured that a result is shocking to one's sense of 
fairness if the sanction imposed is so grave in its impact 
on the individual subjected to it that it is disproportionate 
to the misconduct, incompetence, failure or turpitude of 
the individual, or to the harm or risk of harm to the 
agency or institution, or to the public generally visited or 
threatened by the derelictions of the individuals... 
_ i « _ 
...Paramount too, in cases of sanctions for agencies 
like the police, is the principle that it is the agency and 
not the courts which, before the public must justify the 
integrity and efficiency of their operations. (Emphasis 
added) 
Some might say that this standard is not what applies in Utah, and 
even Counsel for the Department has cited the ''abuse of discretion" standard in 
the previous argument. It should be pointed out, however, that "abuse of 
discretion" and "shocking to one's sense of fairness" are basically the same 
standard. Counsel cannot picture one without the other. Certainly if a punishment 
shocks one's sense of fairness, the agency would have "abused its discretion" and 
vice-versa. 
The Utah Supreme Court has, however, maintained that the elements 
of "abusing discretion" are pretty much the same as those the New York Court 
discussed. In Rushton v. Gelco Express, 732 P.2d 109 (Utah 1986) the Court 
stated that it would "not disturb the findings and orders of the [Industrial] 
Commission unless they are arbitrary and capricious, and they are arbitrary and 
capricious when they are contrary to the evidence or without any reasonable basis 
in the evidence." (Emphasis added). The Court had previously held that the courts 
should not intrude or interfere with the decisions unless "the action is so 
oppressive or unreasonable that it must be deemed capricious and arbitrary, or the 
agency has in some way acted contrary to law or in excess of its authority." 
(Emphasis added) Petty v. Board of Regents, 595 P.2d 1299 (Utah 1979). 
Certainly, arbitrary and capricious as terms used in the law, mean that 
there is no justifiable reason or facts upon which to base a decision. Blacks Law 
Dictionary. Revised Fourth Edition, West Publishing Company (1968) says of 
"arbitrary": ..."without adequate determining principle; not founded in the nature of 
things; nonrational; not done or acting according to reason or judgment..." Blacks 
further defines "abuse of discretion" as: "'Abuse of discretion' is synonymous with 
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a failure to exercise a sound, reasonable, and legal discretion...but means the 
clearly erroneous conclusion and judgment - one that is clearly against logic and 
effect of such facts as are presented../' 
There is little difference between these two definitions and how the 
courts have viewed them. While there are indeed subtle differences, based on 
facts of each case, the Utah Supreme Court has at least recognized that "abuse of 
discretion" must rise to the level of "arbitrary and capricious" in order for the 
Courts [in the case the Personnel Review Board] to reverse and overturn a 
decision of agency management. In Central Bank & Trust Company v. Brimhall, 28 
Utah 2d 14, 497 P.2d 638 (Utah 1972) the court stated: 
...the well-established rule is that the courts indulge him 
[administrator] considerable latitude in determinations he 
makes on questions of fact and also in the exercise of 
his discretion with respect to the responsibilities which 
the law imposes upon him; and they will not interfere 
therewith unless it appears that he acted in excess of his 
powers, or that he so abused his discretion that his 
action was capricious or arbitrary. (Emphasis added) 
The Michigan Appeals Court in People v. Wolschon, 2 Mich.App. 186, 
139 N.W.2d 123 (Mich.App. 1966) stated: 
The term discretion itself involves the idea 
of choice, of our exercise of the will, or a 
determination made between competing consid-
erations. In order to have an "abuse" in 
reaching such determination, the result must 
be so palpably and grossly violative of fact 
and logic that it evidences not the exercise 
of will but perversity of will, not the 
exercise of judgment but the defiance there-
of, not the exercise of reason, but rather of 
passion or bias. (Emphasis added) 
The Wyoming Supreme Court added a further clarification in Waldrop 
v. Weaver, 702 P.2d 1291 (Wyo. 1985) wherein the court said: "an abuse of 
discretion is that which shocks the conscience of the Court and appears so unfair 
and inequitable that a reasonable person could not abide it." (Emphasis added) 
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This position was also accepted by the Louisiana Appellate Court in Schueler v. 
Schueler, 460 So.2d 1120 (La.App. 2 Cir. 1984) 
Is the termination of a peace officer for doing what Sucher did "so 
palpably and grossly violative of fact and logic" or such that a "reasonable person" 
would not agree? The Department says no! 
As already quoted from the leading Utah case on termination of police 
officers, Matter of Discharge of Jones, 720 P.2d 1356 (Utah 1986): 
The sheriff must manage and direct his deputies, and is 
in the best position to know whether their actions merit 
discipline. If the Merit Commission [hearing officer and 
Board] finds upon review that the facts support the 
charges against the deputy, then it must affirm the 
sheriff's disciplinary action, unless it finds the sanction so 
clearly disproportionate to the charges as to amount to 
an abuse of the sheriff's discretion. (Emphasis added) 
The Utah Supreme Court has therefore held that in overturning an 
agency's decision where discretion is exercised [such is certainly the case where 
the department head has to weigh the factors regarding a peace officer's actions 
and determine what penalty to impose], discretion must be abused and that to the 
point where such abuse is arbitrary or capricious, in essence, not based on any 
reason or fact and clearly erroneous. In essence, "Discretion is not abused unless, 
under the circumstances being considered, the agency exceeds the bounds of 
reason." Raimirez v. Civil Service Commission, 594 P.2d 1067 (Colo.App. 1979). 
B 
THE BOARD'S MISUSE OF 
THE STANDARD LED TO ERROR 
IN ITS OVERTURNING OF THE 
AGENCY'S DECISION. 
The Personnel Review Board clearly and explicitly stated in Finding 
B.4: "The evidentiary examiner's conclusion and ruling was neither arbitrary nor 
capricious..." (PRB Decision, p.15). Hence, according to Jones, supra, and Central, 
supra, discretion could not have been abused, because there was a reasonable 
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basis upon which to impose the discipline. The Board was therefore in error to 
impose its judgment and overturn an otherwise valid and appropriate penalty. 
As alluded to in earlier argument, the Board relied on the phrase 
"excessive...in light of the totality of the facts and circumstances..." (Board 
Decision, P.15). Excessive is not defined by the Board or the Board's rules. 
Counsel has also not been able to find that as a standard used by the courts in 
determining whether punishment, such as termination, should be imposed. 
The Department maintains that in order for the Board to overturn the 
penalty imposed by management, it would have to rule, as a matter of law, that the 
punishment is so disproportionate to the offense, so unsupported by credible 
evidence, that reasonable minds could not differ in holding that the punishment 
was too extreme or "shocks one's sense of fairness." If the Board and this court 
cannot make such a finding, the penalty must be sustained. 
Simply because the Board feels the punishment is excessive, absent 
a clear abuse of discretion, does not give the Board a right to substitute its own 
penalty. The hearing officer did not find it so disproportionate, and in fact dealt 
with the AIDS issue as well. There was simply inadequate "nexus" between "some 
training" that could have been given and "excessive force" and "retaliatory" actions 
to hold that somehow an otherwise appropriate discipline be overturned. 
Counsel points out to the Court that the Board imposed a demotion 
and an approximate 15 month suspension without pay, benefits or seniority as "its" 
penalty. As will be discussed in later argument Rule R20-11-1.(4) of the 
Personnel Management Rules, limits a suspension to no more than 30 calendar 
days. Anything more serious would be grounds for termination, depending on the 
"discretion" of management. The actions of Sucher that would justify a 1 % year 
suspension is, in the opinion of Counsel, no different than what it would take to 
justify a termination. Simply stated, the Board wanted to "send a message." 
£ 
COURTS THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY 
HAVE HELD LIKE FACTUAL CIRCUMSTANCES 
JUSTIFY TERMINATION. THUS, IT 
CANNOT BE SAID THAT THE DEPARTMENT'S 
ACTIONS SHOCK FAIRNESS OR ARE AN 
ABUSE OF DISCRETION. 
Courts throughout the country have held that terminating a police 
officer [it must be remembered that Sucher is in this category] for using excessive 
force or for striking a "shackled" or "handcuffed" prisoner is proper. With this 
being the case, the Board inappropriately looked at the AIDS issue [an issue it 
admitted had little effect, if any, on Sucher's reaction] in determining that the 
penalty was not justified. As recited earlier, the Board held that Sucher (1) 
retaliated, not because of the AIDS issue, but because the prisoner "spit" in his 
face, (2) used excessive force which had nothing to do with the AIDS issue -
simply a matter of using unjustified and harsh force in a situation that justified no 
force at all, and (3) any claim for self defense was groundless - in essence Sucher 
was not defending himself against AIDS, but was simply getting even with 
someone who spit on him. 
AIDS training is irrelevant as it relates to the findings of Sucher's 
inappropriate behavior. First of all, the use of excessive force cannot be tolerated 
at any time, regardless of what the circumstances. This issue is totally 
independent from AIDS training. 
These grounds, in and of themselves justify disciplinary action, 
including termination. The potential civil rights liability to the State and the 
institution in addition to the issue of control and discipline among the staff dictates 
that firm action be taken by management. It was and it is justified. 
Second, the hitting of a fully restrained prisoner is independent 
justification for termination, especially since the Board and its hearing officer both 
found that the attack was retaliation and excessive. 
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An Illinois Appellate Court in Klein v. Board of Fire and Police 
Commissioners of the City of Pana, 23 lll.App.3d 201, 318 N.E.2d 727 (III.App. 
1974) addressed this issue: 
The principles governing a review of a police officer's 
dismissal have been well established in Illinois. Though 
cause has not been defined by statute it has been 
construed to mean some substantial shortcoming which 
renders an employee's continuance in office in some way 
detrimental to the discipline and efficiency of the service, 
and which law and sound public opinion recognizes a 
good cause for his no longer holding the position...We 
understand the provoking nature of obscene name 
calling. However, we also believe that an experienced, 
competent police officer should have sufficient stature to 
control himself and resist the temptation to resort to 
physical violence, particularly with reference to a nineteen 
year old boy neither posing nor offering any physical 
threat. The many able reputable and hard working men 
and women who wear the badge of a police officer 
should not have to be categorized and judged by the 
improper and ruthless acts of one so obsessed with the 
power and authority of his office. (Emphasis added) 
Certainly, Mr. Sucher was an experienced officer, a supervisor that 
should have known better. The act of spitting, while offensive, was not physically 
harmful, but basically an act of defiance on the part of the prisoner. When the act 
of retaliation was committed, the prisoner was totally shackled and handcuffed and 
was held by four other officers of the prison - the prisoner was totally restrained 
and neither posed nor offered any threat to Sucher. This is, as the Illinois court 
stated "improper and ruthless" and without just cause. 
The Alabama Court of Civil Appeals in Lowery v. City of Mobile Police 
Department, 448 So.2d 388 (Ala.Civ.App. 1984) sustained the termination of a six 
foot six inch, 300 pound police officer (no threat to this officer) who struck an 
unrestrained prisoner who had become argumentative and grabbed a metal screen 
in the booking area. The Court held that since the superiors testified that such 
force was "unnecessary and a breach of police department policy" the termination 
was proper. 
r\r\ 
In Johnson v. Civil Service Commission of Clinton, 352 N.W.2d 252 
(Iowa 1984), the Iowa Supreme Court sustained the dismissal of a police officer 
who struck a man at least twice while the victim was on the ground and on his 
stomach. At the time of the blows, both officers had the man "pinned down." The 
Court stated: 
...This case is difficult because the charge of misconduct 
is Johnson's first offense. Nonetheless, the nature of the 
offense is abhorrent when viewed from the perspective 
that an officer is supposed to protect citizens rather than 
injure them. Moreover, while it is distasteful to remove a 
police officer, protection of the public and furthering the 
general good must be our paramount concern... 
...We, as did the chief, the mayor, the Commission, and 
the trial court, determine there was no justification for at 
least two of the blows Johnson inflicted upon Susie. An 
unjustified assault by a police officer cannot be tolerated. 
(Emphasis added) 
The Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania in Civil Service 
Commission of the City of Philadelphia v. Wojtusik, 525 A.2d 1255 (Pa.CmwIth. 
1987) reinstated the termination of an officer who was "off duty" but who had 
assaulted an arresting officer. In upholding the decision to terminate the officer, 
the court stated that 'The conduct of law enforcement officers must be 'above and 
beyond reproach.'" 
In two similar cases to the instant case the hitting of handcuffed 
persons by police officers was considered sufficient grounds for termination. Such 
discipline did not "abuse discretion." The first is In re Appeal of Herrington, 458 
A.2d 320 (Pa.CmwIth. 1983) wherein the appellant had kneed and kicked a man 
who was handcuffed. Herrington argued that the penalty was too severe [as 
opposed to the Board stating that Sucher's punishment was excessive] for the 
offense of assaulting a handcuffed person. The court said: "Suffice it to say that 
we do not believe that the Commission abused its discretion in affirming 
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Appellant's dismissal in light of the serious nature of Appellant's misconduct." The 
second case is Appeal of Tuch, 159 N.J.Super. 219, 387 A.2d 1199 (S.Ct N.J. 
1978) where the termination of a police officer who was found guilty of simple 
assault, striking a prisoner while the prisoner was handcuffed, was sustained 
These cases certainly show that courts have found that termination is 
not only reasonable, but is proper for situations similar to those of Sucher In 
addition, however, other courts have found that simply using "excessive force" is 
also a ground for termination. 
The Minnesota Court of Appeals in Bush v. City of St Joseph, 395 
N.W.2d 466 (Minn.App. 1986) dealt with an issue where an officer pulled hair, 
grabbed an individual by the neck and used "excessive and unjustifiable force 
under the circumstances." In sustaining the termination the court stated "The use 
of excessive and unjustified force while detaining these two juveniles reflects on 
the qualifications of the officer in performing his duties and directly affects the 
rights and interests of the public." See also Linton v. Bossier City Municipal Fire 
and Police Civil Service Board, 428 So.2d 515 (La.App. 2 Cir. 1983) 
The Utah Supreme Court has even gone so far as sustaining the 
termination of a deputy sheriff who argued with attorneys at a deposition. 
Hutchison v. Cartwright, 692 P.2d 772 (Utah 1984). 
In light of each of the above referenced and cited cases, as well as 
others that could be cited, it is clear that courts, including the Utah Supreme 
Court, have found such action on the part of individuals such as Mr. Sucher, 
justifiable grounds for termination and not "arbitrary," "capricious," "excessive," or 
an "abuse of discretion." As a matter of law, the Departments termination of 
Sucher is proper. The department head so found and the hearing officer [whose 
findings of fact and conclusions of law were all accepted by the Board except the 
penalty] so found. The Board, sitting in an appellate position cannot, as a matter of 
law, hold from the evidence and cases that termination in this instance was an 
"abuse of discretion," would "shock one's sense of fairness," is so "palpably and 
grossly violative of fact and logic" or devoid of any "reasonable basis." The exact 
same penalty has been imposed many times by other jurisdictions for similar 
instances and has been found to be reasonable. 
Based on the foregoing analysis and discussion, it is clear that the 
Board, not the agency, abused its discretion, and overturned an otherwise proper 
penalty for the grievous acts of Mr. Sucher. It cannot be said, as a matter of law, 
that the action of the department head was so egregious or such an "abuse of 
discretion" that the penalty must be overturned and something else imposed. As 
such, the Board's actions in doing so are error and must be reversed. 
POINT ill 
THE PERSONNEL REVIEW BOARD ACTED 
BEYOND ITS GRANT OF AUTHORITY BY 
IMPOSING ITS OWN PENALTY 
The Board overturned the decision of the Department of Corrections 
Executive Director and imposed a penalty that is not sustainable under the 
statutes of Utah or the Rules promulgated to implement discipline. As such, the 
Board abused its discretion, acted beyond its scope of authority, and creates a 
dangerous precedent which must not stand as the role of the Board. This is clearly 
error and requires the board's actions be overturned. 
The leading Utah case on point is Vetterli v. Civil Service Commission 
of Salt Lake City, 145 P.2d 792 (Utah 1944). This involved a case where the Civil 
Service Commission overturned a termination and imposed a penalty of 
suspension greater than what the department head was authorized to impose. The 
Commission claimed that it had the ability to impose its own penalty based on 
statutory provisions which provided that the Commission "shall fully hear and 
determine the matter/' 
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The court phrased the key issue as follows: "...if the commission may 
order a suspension from office as a substitute for discharge, on an appeal it may 
do that which the removing officer in the first instance could not lawfully have 
done, if the suspension is for more than 15 days [the maximum that could be 
imposed by a department head]/' A resolution to this issue turned on what the 
legislative intent through statutory enactment provided. 
In analyzing the statutory provisions and its conclusion, the court said: 
We do not find in our statute any phrase which grants 
the same jurisdiction on appeal as is conferred where the 
power on appeal is to "affirm, modify, or reverse," - an 
expression usually if not universally employed where 
such authority is actually conferred. The substitution of 
suspension for 6 months without pay, in lieu of dismissal 
was bevond the power of the commission." (Emphasis 
added). 
Point I of this brief clearly establishes an "appellate" role of the Board 
and its hearing officers. No statutory authority of the type viewed necessary by the 
court in Vetterii appears. U.C.A. §67-19-20(5)(a) simply establishes the Board as a 
"quasi-judicial body to hear appeals from employees..." Appeals to the Board can 
only be taken on the grounds found in U.C.A. §67-19-25(6)(a) where it is alleged 
that the decision of the hearing officer was based on "incorrect or arbitrary 
interpretation of facts" (the Board sustained all facts as found by the hearing 
officer) "or that a matter of law is in dispute" (there was no such matter in 
dispute - the Hearing Officer found in total favor of the Department and the Board 
simply "substituted" its own penalty). 
No provision provides the Board with the power to "rehear" a matter 
and render a decision as if it were the department head. Yet that is not only what 
was done here. It looked beyond whether there was "substantial evidence" to 
sustain the action of the department head and imposed both a 15 month 
suspension without pay [the Board called it administrative leave without pay] - 2V* 
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times greater than what was overturned in Vetterii case and 15 times greater than 
what a department head is authorized to impose. In addition the Board also 
imposed a demotion. 
The Board has no authority to impose what it did and is limited by the 
Personnel Management Rules just as department heads. R20-11 of the Personnel 
Management Rules governs discipline. R20-11-1.(4) lists the penalties which may 
be imposed for discipline. They include one or more of the following: 
(4)(a) Written reprimand 
(4)(b) Suspension of the employee without pay up to 
thirty calendar days per occurrence requiring 
discipline. 
(4)(c) Demotion of the employee utilizing one of the 
following methods as provided by law... 
(4)(d) A department head shall dismiss or demote an 
employee only in accordance with the 
provisions of 67-19-18(3)... (Emphasis added) 
Dismissals and demotions are dealt with in Rule R20-11-2 of the 
Personnel Management Rules. This section essentially tracks §67-19-18(1) as 
referred to in prior argument. There it is clear that the department head is the 
proper party to impose the penalty which then is what is "reviewed" on appeal. 
The above penalties constitute the only authorized penalties which 
may be imposed under Rules and law. The punishment fashioned by the Personnel 
Review Board was not a written reprimand or termination of Mr. Sucher. It 
demoted him from Grade 23 to Grade 21 and reduced his pay by 10 per cent and 
suspended him 15 months without pay. 
This action assumes that the Board in its "wisdom" knows the 
workings of a department better than the department head since demotion of 
require change of duties and responsibilities and neither the suspension nor 
demotion were part of the originally imposed discipline. The Board is certainly not 
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in a position to make that kind of administrative decision and, as far as can be 
adduced from the transcript and exhibits, there was no evidence taken to justify 
the arbitrary decision of the Board to impose a demotion on management. In 
essence the Board is saying "We know better what to do with the operations of 
the department than the department administrator - find a place for this demoted 
employee." This is error! 
"Administrative leave without pay" is simply a glorified term for 
"suspension." Such is not an authorized penalty. Nowhere is the Board granted 
power to create penalties. Any reasonable doubt regarding the existence of its 
power to create penalties must be resolved against it. Williams v. Public Service 
Commission, 754 P.2d 41 (Utah 1988). The Board must apply only those penalties 
which are authorized by statute or rules governing agencies. 
While Rule R665-1~26.15.14 adopted by the Board does state that 
the Board may "affirm, reverse, adopt, modify, supplement, amend or reject the 
Hearing Officer's step 5 decision, either in whole or in part...or may make any other 
appropriate disposition of the appeal," it goes too far in purportedly granting the 
Board "carte blanche" authority to step into the shoes of the department head and 
"do what the Board pleases." No statutory provision permits such a "substantive" 
rule of the Board. This attempt is beyond the authority of the Board. 
Obviously the Board has invoked this provision in this case. No 
statute gives the Board such authority and the Board cannot create an "all 
powerful" scope of review by rule. As has been seen in this case, that "open 
ended" authority that the Board has given itself has created "new penalties," has 
"placed it in the role of the department head" and has been an "abuse" of its 
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power. The numerous court cases cited establish clearly that this is improper and 
that the Board has gone "too far." 
Counsel does not contest the fact that the Board may modify the 
hearing officer's decision if it finds that the hearing officer did not apply the proper 
role of review for the department head's decision, or that there was/was not 
substantial evidence to sustain the department head. It does not, however, have 
any authority or right to "invent" a new role for itself without clear statutory 
language - which does not exist here! 
As was stated by the Supreme court of South Dakota in Drovdalo v. 
Department of Public Safety, 255 N.W.2d 437 (S.D. 1977), after citing Vetterli: 
There is nothing in this statute which gives the 
commission any discretion regarding the disciplinary 
action to be taken. On the contrary, SDCL 3-7-15 
specifically provides for the removal, discharge, or 
reduction by the appointing officer. The function of the 
commission under SDCL 3-7-17 is merely to determine 
whether or not the removal, discharge, or reduction was 
made for good cause... 
In this case, the courts reversed the Police Civil Service Commission 
that had overturned a determination by the department head and imposed its own 
penalty which was a "lesser" penalty. 
The Board stated in its Decision and Order that: "The period of 
absence from September 14, 1987 through January 7, 1989 shall be treated as an 
administrative leave without pay, during which no seniority accrues, nor does that 
time count toward the annual leave and sick leave accrual rates." (PRB Decision 
p.17). The only use of administrative leave for such circumstances is found in 
R20-11-1.(2). This rule gives the agency head two options during the pendency of 
an investigation. The employee may be placed on paid [as opposed to unpaid] 
administrative leave for up to thirty working days, or more if the director of the 
Department of Human Resource Management approves. Such assignment, 
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however, does not take away seniority, benefits, leave accrual, etc, nor is there 
any such authorization for usage of administrative leave [either paid or unpaid] for 
a "final penalty." 
The only other possibility for the use of such leave is found in U.C.A. 
§67-19-18(2) which allows a "suspension" without pay pending dismissals 
procedures taking place if the retention of the employee poses a grave threat to 
health safety or to the public interest. It is a "suspension" not "administrative leave 
without pay." This the Board created. 
The Board's action, whether seen as a suspension pending an 
investigation under R20-11-1.(2) or as a suspension pending appeal under §67-
19-18(2), requires a finding of at least one of the factors listed, i.e. grave threat to 
the public interest, etc. By imposing the penalty as enunciated, the Board must 
have implicitly found that Sucher's conduct was aggravated to this extent. 
In essence, the Board told Mr. Sucher he was fired and then 
instructed the Department to "rehire" him some 15 months later and in a demoted 
state. This it clearly cannot do. Appellant asserts the Board has no inherent power 
and can assert only those powers expressly granted or clearly implied as 
necessary to its duties and responsibilities. (See Williams, supra). 
Under U.C.A. §67-19-18(1): "The director [Department of Human 
Resource Management - formerly Division of Personnel Management] shall 
promulgate rules governing the procedural and documentary requirements of 
disciplinary dismissals and demotions." On the other hand, U.C.A. §67-19-20, 
which established the Personnel Review Board, sets no standards for review. §67-
19-21, dealing with matters which may be submitted on appeal, is similarly silent 
as to the Board's rights in this area. 
- 3 0 -
Thus, DHRM and not the Board controls this area. For the Board to 
usurp authority and impose both a 15 month suspension and a demotion does 
violence to the clear roles set for it and the department head by statute. 
Counsel asks the question: "How much cause must be shown to 
justify a termination when findings of 'retaliation,' 'excessive force,' and unjustified 
claims of self defense were the determinations of the Board?" The Board has 
established a standard that is both unrealistic and unworkable. In order to even 
sustain a 15 month suspension and demotion, the Department had to prove a 
substantial offense - it did. Yet the Board is saying: THAT IS NOT ENOUGH! 
All U.C.A. §67-19-18(1) requires is that "just cause" be shown. The 
Board, in holding that sufficient evidence and grounds existed to do what it did, is 
also sustaining "just cause" to sustain a termination. 
It seems wholly appropriate to limit agencies in the number of 
days/months suspensions can be imposed. If suspensions could be imposed up to 
15 months - or even two or three years by department heads, great abuses could 
exist and suspensions could be used as tools of "oppression" instead of discipline. 
Such is not in keeping with merit principles. If someone's actions are serious 
enough to merit a 15 months suspension and demotion, they are certainly serious 
enough for dismissal. 
Simply because it is the Board that is imposing a lesser penalty than 
termination (even though management could not have done what the Board did) 
does not make the action right or justified. 
Neither the Board nor the Court can substitute its own judgment for 
that of the department head. The Board definitely felt that more than a 30 day 
suspension was justified (the maximum management can impose is 30 days). Such 
was error. This court likewise must not make the same error by sustaining 
something not even management can do. This includes trimming the suspension to 
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30 days with reinstatement. Neither the Department, the Hearing Officer nor the 
Board has done that. The only appropriate relief, based on the Board's "abuse of 
discretion" and acting ''beyond its authority" is to reverse the Board and reinstate 
the termination. To do otherwise would make the court a party to the inappropriate 
actions of the Board. 
POINT IV 
THE PERSONNEL REVIEW BOARD IMPROPERLY 
AND PREJUDICIALLY RELIED ON THE ISSUE 
OF AIDS TRAINING AS A GROUND TO IMPOSE 
ITS OWN PENALTY - SUCH IS REVERSIBLE ERROR 
Appellant submits that, as a matter of law, the issue of AIDS training 
is irrelevant. The Board agreed that Sucher's belief was subjective. It was not only 
subjective, but erroneous (PRB Decision, p. 14). As noted in Thomas v. Atascadero 
Unified School District, 662 F.Supp. 376 (C.D.Cal. 1987) the best available medical 
evidence shows that AIDS is not spread by anything other than "[i]nfected blood, 
semen, or vaginal fluids (and, possibly, mother's milk)." The court concluded: 'The 
overwhelming weight of medical evidence is that the AIDS virus is not transmitted 
by human bites, even bites that break the skin." 
As noted in United States v. Moore, 846 F.2d 1163 (8th Cir. 1988): 
The evidence established that there are no well proven 
cases of AIDS transmission by way of bite; that contact 
with saliva has never been shown to transmit the 
disease: and that in one case a person who had been 
deeply bitten by a person with AIDS tested negative 
several months later. Indeed, a recent study has 
indicated that saliva actually may contain substances that 
protect the body from AIDS. New York Times, May 6, 
1988, at A 16, col. 4. (Emphasis added) 
The Board in this case found that Sucher's use of force was "not 
appropriate or reasonable, but his act of punching Loya constituted excessive 
force." (PRB Decision, p. 14) The only way to come to that conclusion is to 
compare Sucher's conduct to a standard. That standard is the training he received. 
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He had been taught that striking an inmate under the circumstances 
of June 19, 1987 was inappropriate, unreasonable and excessive. Sucher had 
received this training! Kevin Gray testified at the Step 5 hearing that he had taught 
a class on the abuse of force in February of 1986 (2:46). That class was attended 
by Mr. Sucher (2:47). Mr. Gray was accepted as an expert (2:53). Mr. Gary was 
asked a hypothetical question about an inmate who was handcuffed, wearing leg 
irons and being carried who then spit at someone. Gray stated that restraint would 
be as high on the continuum of force that would be acceptable. Anything more 
than that would be abusive (2:54). 
At the conclusion of Mr. Gray's direct testimony, Mr. Sucher indicated 
he wished to cross examine. The Hearing Officer stated, "Go ahead. Ask him what 
you want but I think it's clear that you have a training program, probably very 
good, and Mr. Sucher attended one class anyway. I don't know that additional 
information is needed" (2:60). Appellant submits that the instruction given Mr. 
Sucher put him on notice that striking a fully restrained inmate who spit on him 
was excessive, regardless of the reason! This is so even if AIDS was not 
specifically addressed in the training. 
Counsel points out that Sucher hit Loya after he was spit upon. 
Training (whether one has AIDS or not) would center on how one deals with the 
"post spit' situation. Once saliva is on the skin, hitting a fully shackled prisoner will 
have no effect on what the saliva will do to the party being spit upon. Hence, a 
clear finding of "retaliation" and "excessive force" with no "self defense" being 
credible. The training necessary to deal with the situation was given. Sucher had 
no justification (including the weak excuse of no AIDS training) for what he did. 
This case is analogous to code of conduct cases. The concept of 
"conduct unbecoming" has been challenged numerous times on vagueness 
grounds, both in the law enforcement field as well as areas of professional 
conduct for licensed professionals. In the overwhelming number of cases, the 
courts have rejected such challenges on the grounds that it is impossible to write 
a specific regulation for every possible type of conduct which would be 
"unbecoming". Similarly, it is impossible to train someone on the appropriate 
amount of force for every imagineable situation. However, the facts and 
conclusions of this case make it clear that the AIDS issue was irrelevant to the 
excessive and improper acts of Sucher. 
The hearing officer added that even if Sucher had not received 
specific training on this type of situation, as a certified peace officer he knew or 
should have known he would be subjected to abuse, including being spit on, and 
that striking an inmate was a last resort, short of deadly force. (Step 5 Decision, p. 
9-10). Even the average citizen knows that a peace officer is entitled to use force, 
but that retaliation is not permitted and is grounds for suit. 
The hearing officer concluded that the lack of specific training on 
AIDS was not a sound basis for modifying the Department's decision to terminate 
Sucher. In discussing this issue he stated: "No evidence was produced to the 
effect that AIDS can be transmitted through saliva or spit or that AIDS is such a 
problem at the Prison that Sucher and other prison personnel were inadequately 
trained with respect to it." (Step 5 Decision, p. 11, Emphasis added). In other 
words, Sucher's training was found to be adequate as it relates to his use of force 
in this case. His subjective fear of AIDS makes no difference. 
The Board concluded, as a matter of law (since it came up with no 
facts that would justify reversal of the hearing officer's decision on this point) that 
it did make a difference. It stated: "[t] Board makes a different ultimate legal 
conclusion than did the hearing officer." (PRB Decision, p. 16) The Board's 
conclusion is flawed. The Board's second finding of fact states: 
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Sucher did not receive appropriate training or adequate 
notice of how to properly respond to a situation in which 
an inmate — a potential AIDS-infected person or a 
suspected carrier with the condition of AIDS Related 
Complex, which is also referred to as ARC and Pre-
AIDS — threatens to spit or otherwise transmit his saliva 
to the exposed skin of correctional staff. (PRB Decision, 
p. 13) 
The Board held, in effect, as a matter of law, that all inmates 
presumed to be AIDS carriers. There is no sound basis for this conclusion. The 
Hearing Officer's finding, which was based on substantial evidence, was that AIDS 
was not that type of problem at the prison. Unless the overwhelming weight of the 
evidence is to the contrary, the Board has no authority to reverse the finding of the 
Hearing Officer. Ray v. Consolidated Freightways, 289 P.2d 196, 4 Ut. 137 (1955). 
The Board cites nothing in the record in support of its conclusion. Indeed, the 
record will not support such a conclusion. Sucher admitted he had no information 
that Inmate Loya used intravenous drugs or had engaged in homosexual activity. 
He simply felt because such activities existed in the facility that Loya might have 
engaged in them. (4:36) He admitted at the time of the incident he did not know if 
Loya had AIDS. (4:37) He testified there was only one inmate housed in the same 
building known to carry the AIDS virus. (3:133) This Court must overturn the 
Board's unsupported conclusion. Stegen v. Department of Employment Security, 
751 P.2d 1160 (Utah App. 1988). 
In Department of Social Services v. Janice T., 524 N.Y.S.2d 267 
(A.D.2 Dept. 1988) the court considered the propriety of issuing an order for an 
AIDS test on a woman who had bitten a deputy sheriff. The woman was the 
subject of a child neglect hearing in Family Court. The appellate court noted that 
AIDS was unrelated to the pending neglect petition. It also found that the record 
was devoid of any evidence that she had or was suspected of having AIDS. It 
found that the Family Court abused its discretion in ordering the test. 
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In the instant case, the record is devoid of substantial evidence that 
Inmate Loya had or could be legitimately suspected of having AIDS. It was an 
abuse of discretion for the Board to legitimize Sucher's "Gestalt" feeling (4:48) and 
conclude, as a matter of law, that he should have been trained regarding AIDS. 
This Court should apply the correction-of-error standard, granting no deference to 
the Board's legal conclusion. Williams, supra, at p. 50. Deference should be 
granted to the Department. Jones, supra. 
Assuming, as the Board did, that the Department should have trained 
Sucher regarding AIDS, they have again sent a mixed message. Even if AIDS 
could be transmitted by the act of spitting, no peace officer is entitled to retaliate. 
The Board found Sucher's striking inmate Loya to be retaliation, not to prevent 
being spit on a second time. He would not have been entitled to strike Loya in 
retaliation even if Loya had shot at him. 
The Board found there were numerous alternative measures Sucher 
could have used to avoid being spit on again. This is consistent with Sucher's 
own statement that he had walked away in the past. It concluded, "Considered in 
the total context of the Loya incident, Sucher's act of punching Loya in the mouth 
was not the act that a reasonable person would take in the same situation. Thus, 
Sucher's reliance upon a self defense claim is found to have been unreasonable, 
without merit, and wholly inappropriate as a response." Decision and Order, p. 15. 
This illustrates the inconsistency of the Board's reasoning. Training informs and 
educates, it does not turn unreasonable people into reasonable people. The 
Department should not be required to retain as a peace officer a person which the 
Board has found responds unreasonably and retaliates with excessive force. 
Sucher's conduct also shows the issue of AIDS training is irrelevant to 
the issue at hand. He testified that at the time of the incident he was under the 
impression that AIDS could be transmitted by any bodily fluid (3:135). He had been 
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spit on in the past (4:43,52). He also testified that he harbored a fear of AIDS for 
well over two years prior to the incident of June 19th (3:134). Yet he mingled with 
prisoners a minimum of an hour and a half every day from June 19th to at least 
August 17th of 1987 and had no problems or confrontations with them at all 
(3:147-9). He had his fourth AIDS test on September 28, 1987. He stated that 
the series of tests was to determine if there had been exposure, followed by three 
tests to verify the accuracy of the first test (3:190). On the date he testified, 
December 4, 1987, he said that he still feared the AIDS virus (4:49). He testified 
he and his wife no longer slept together because of not knowing about whether or 
not inmate Loya had AIDS (3:188-9). One must wonder why his two year old fear 
suddenly changed after the Loya incident, but had no effect before. 
Being spit on is something that one can expect when working in a 
corrections setting. Mr. Sucher had been spit on in the past. He was asked if he 
could have walked away after inmate Loya first spit on him. He answered, "In the 
past I've been spit on in medium security by inmates and just looked at them, got 
up, and stood up and walked over to the sally port and washed myself off" (4:43). 
Later, when asked a similar question, he stated, "I don't know. I've done it in the 
past" (4:52). Are we to believe that the reason he did not walk away on June 19th 
was presumably because he feared Loya had AIDS? Yet by his own testimony, 
the only basis he had for suspecting Inmate Loya had AIDS was a "Gestalt feeling" 
(4:38). Appellant submits the reason he did not walk away, as he had in the past, 
was not a fear of AIDS. Inmate Loya was handcuffed and shackled. He was 
being held by at least three other corrections officers. It was because Sucher 
could strike Loya for being spit upon without fear of Loya hitting back. 
If Mr. Sucher truly had a fear of AIDS for two years prior to June 19, 
1987, and believed it could be transmitted by any bodily fluid, one must wonder 
why he continued to work in an environment where he had previously been spit on. 
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If he still possesses that belief, one must wonder why he would insist on going 
back into such an environment. He argues that he should have received training, 
asking this Court to conclude it would have made a difference in his conduct He 
was spit on before and walked away, even though he held his subjective fear of 
AIDS for over two years prior to this incident Clearly, training would have made 
no difference 
If anyone would be motivated to seek out the medical evidence 
accepted in Thomas and Moore, supra, it would be someone with the belief Mr 
Sucher claims to have. Indeed, the information he did have prior to the incident 
told him saliva was not recognized as a means of transmitting the disease He 
could have followed up on that information Yet on December 4, 1987, after four 
AIDS test, he maintained he still possessed the belief and fear. If he did possess 
the fear at the time he struck inmate Loya, he should not now Appellant submits 
that training would do little to disabuse him of his mistaken belief in light of 
Sucher's insistence that his fear remains. 
At best, Sucher has a fear that motivated him to strike someone who 
spit on him. Still clinging to that fear he asks this Court to return him to the same 
environment where he may be spit on again. At worst, he is hiding behind a fear 
he does not possess in an attempt to rationalize behavior found to be 
unreasonable and wholly inappropriate. His conduct is not consistent with his 
arguments. The Court should rely on his conduct and reinstate the decision of the 
Hearing Officer and the department head. 
CONCLUSION 
Each of the foregoing arguments individually justify the Courts 
reinstatement of the dismissal. Taken as a whole, it is overwhelmingly clear that 
the Board abused its discretion and committed reversible error in substituting its 
judgment when no appropriate ground to do so exists. 
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This Court should apply the correction of error standard found in Utah 
Department of Administrative Services v. Public Service Commission, 658 P.2d 
601 (Utah 1983) and correct the error created by the Board and reinstate the 
termination of Mr. Sucher. 
DATED this H day of April, 1989. 
~STEPHEN13. SCHWENDIMAN 
Assistant Attorney General 
Chief, Tax & Business 
Regulation Division 
Attorney for Appellant 
Department of Corrections 
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ADDENDUM 
Utah Code Annotated 67-19-18 through 25, 1953 as Amended 
Department of Human Resource Management, Personnel Management Rules, Rule 
R20-11-1 and 2 
Utah Personnel Review Board Rules, R665-1-25 and 26 
Utah Personnel Review Board Glossary, Appendix B, not part of the official rules 
but published separately for guidance 
Law Enforcement Code of Ethics, Adoped August 6, 1968 by the Utah Council on 
Peace Officer Standards and Training 
Testimony of Kevin Gray relating to training given to Paul Sucher 
Paul S. Sucher v. Department of Corrections, 6 PRB/H.O 88 [Hearing Officer's 
decision] issued January 8, 1988 
Paul S. Sucher v. Utah State Prison, 3 PRB 27 [Personnel Review Board decision] 
issued December 19, 1988. 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 67-19-18 THROUGH 25 
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67-19-16. Appointments to schedule B positions 
— Examinations — Certification on ap-
propriate registers — Probationary 
service — Dismissal — Tenure. 
(1) Appointments to positions under schedule B 
shall be made from registers of applicants who have 
been selected by competitive procedures as defined by 
the director 
(2) Vacancy notices for career service positions 
shall be publicly announced for penods of time to be 
determined by the director, but in every case a mini-
mum of five days, and in a manner designed to at-
tract an optimum number of qualified applicants 
(3) The director shall validate the examining in-
struments, consulting with agency officials and out-
side experts toward this end 
(4) When a department requests certification of ap-
plicants who have passed the tests, the director shall 
certify applicants on appropnate registers defined by 
rules promulgated by the director 
(5) Appointments to fill vacancies shall be made by 
the agency head from appropriate registers for proba-
tionary periods to be defined by rules and regulations 
promulgated by the director A person serving a pro-
bationary period may be dismissed at any time by the 
appointing officer without hearing or appeal, unless 
discrimination is alleged Tenure shall be granted ca-
reer service employees upon the successful comple-
tion of the probationary period 1983 
67-19-17. Reappointment of employees not re-
tained in exempt position. 
Any career service employee accepting an appoint-
ment to an exempt position who is not retained by the 
appointing officer, unless discharged for cause as pro-
vided by this act or by regulation, shall 
(1) be appointed to any career service position 
for which the employee qualifies in a pay grade 
comparable to the employee's last position in the 
career service provided an opening exists, or 
(2) be appointed to any lesser career service 
position for which the employee qualifies pend-
ing the opening of a position described in Subsec-
tion (1) of this section The director shall main-
tain a reappointment register for this purpose 
and it shall have precedence over other registers 
1979 
67-19-18. Dismissals and demotions — Grounds 
— Disciplinary action — Procedure — 
Reductions in force. 
(1) Dismissals or demotions of career service em-
ployees shall only be to advance the good of the public 
interest, and for such just causes as inefficiency, in-
competency, failure to maintain skills or adequate 
performance levels, insubordination, disloyalty to the 
orders of a superior, misfeasance, malfeasance, or 
nonfeasance in office There shall be no dismissal for 
reasons of race, sex, age, physical handicap, national 
origin, religion, political affiliation, or other non-
merit factor including the exercise of rights under 
this chapter The director shall promulgate rules gov-
erning the procedural and documentary requirements 
of disciplinary dismissals and demotions 
(2) If an agency head finds that a career service 
employee is charged with aggravated misconduct or 
that retention of a career service employee would en-
danger the peace and safety of others or pose a grave 
threat to the public interest, the employee may be 
suspended pending the administrative appeal to the 
department head as provided in Subsection (3) 
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(3) No person shall be demoted or dismissed from a 
career service position unless the department head or 
designated representative has observed the following 
procedures 
(a) The department head or designated repre-
sentative notifies the employee in writing of the 
reasons for the dismissal or demotion, 
(b) The employee has no less than five working 
days to reply and have the reply considered by 
the department head, 
(c) The employee has an opportunity to be 
heard by the department head or designated rep-
resentative, and 
(d) Following the hearing an employee may be 
dismissed or demoted if the department head 
finds adequate cause or reason 
(4) Reductions in force required by inadequate 
funds, change of workload, or lack of work shall be 
governed by retention rosters established by the di-
rector Under such circumstances 
(a) The agency head shall designate the cate-
gory of work to be eliminated, subject to review 
by the director, 
(b) Temporary and probationary workers shall 
be separated before any tenured employee, 
(c) Retention points for each tenured employee 
shall be computed according to rules promul-
gated by the director allowing appropnate con-
sideration for proficiency and for seniority in 
state government, including any active duty mil-
itary service fulfilled subsequent to original state 
appointment Tenured employees shall be sepa-
rated in the order of their retention points, the 
employee with the lowest points to be discharged 
first, and 
(d) A career service employee who is separated 
in a reduction in force shall be placed on the re-
appointment roster provided for in Subsection 
67-19-17(2), and shall be reappointed without ex-
amination to any vacancy for which the employee 
is qualified which occurs within one year of the 
date of the separation 
(e) An employee separated due to a reduction 
in force may appeal to the department head for 
an administrative review The notice of appeal 
must be submitted within 20 working days after 
the employee's receipt of written notification of 
separation The employee may appeal the deci-
sion of the department head according to the 
grievance and appeals procedure of this act 1963 
67-19-19. Political activity of employees — 
Rules and regulations — Highway pa-
trol — Hatch Act 
Except as otherwise provided by law or by rules 
promulgated under this section for federally aided 
programs, the following provisions apply with regard 
to political activity of career service employees in all 
grades and positions 
(1) State career service employees may volun-
tarily participate in political activity subject to 
the following provisions 
(a) if any state career service employee is 
elected to any partisan or full-time nonparti-
san political office, that employee shall be 
granted a leave of absence without pay for 
times when monetary compensation is re-
ceived for service in political office, 
(b) no officer or employee in career service 
may engage in any political activity during 
the hours of employment, nor may any per-
son solicit political contributions from em-
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ployees of the executive branch during hours 
of employment for political purposes, and 
(c) partisan political activity may not be a 
basis for employment, promotion, demotion, 
or dismissal, except that the director shall 
adopt rules providing for the discipline or 
punishment of a state officer or employee 
who violates any provision of this section 
(2) (a) Notwithstanding any other provision of 
this section, no member of the Utah High-
way Patrol may use his official authority or 
influence for the purpose of interfering with 
an election or affecting the results of an elec 
tion 
(b) No person may induce or attempt to 
induce any member of the Utah Highway 
Patrol to participate in any activity prohib-
ited by this subsection 
(3) Nothing contained in this section ma> be 
construed to 
(a) preclude voluntary contributions b> a 
state employee to the part} or candidate of 
the officer's or employee's choice, or 
(b) permit partisan political activity b> 
any state employee who is prevented or re 
stncted from engaging in the political activ-
ity by the provisions of the federal Hatch 
Act 1988 
67-19-20. Personnel Re vie* Board created — 
Members — Appointment — Terms — 
Organization — Removal — Compen-
sation — Powers and duties — Hearing 
officers — Executive secretary — 
Hearings — Appeals — Employees. 
(1) There shall be a Personnel Review Board of five 
members, appointed by the governor for four-year 
terms, three with terms coterminous with the gover-
nor's and two with terms beginning January 1 of the 
third year of the governor's regular term in office 
The members of the existing five member merit sys 
tern council shall complete the terms for which they 
are appointed and subsequent appointments shall be 
made in a manner to be determined by the governor 
to effect the rotation required by this subsection 
(2) The Personnel Review Board shall be organized 
as follows 
(a) The members of the board shall be persons 
in sympathy with the application of merit princi-
ples to public employment No member of the 
board shall be a member of any local, state or 
national committee of a political party or an offi-
cer or member of a committee in any partisan 
political club, or shall hold, or be a candidate for, 
any paid public office No more than three mem-
bers of the board shall be from the same political 
party, 
(b) The governor shall annually designate one 
of the board members to serve as chairman, and 
any three board members may constitute a quo-
rum for the performance of all duties and respon-
sibilities hereinafter set forth and the actions of a 
majority of those present at a hearing at which a 
quorum is present shall be the actions of the 
board 
(3) The board members may be removed only for 
cause 
(4) Each board member shall receive a per diem for 
official meetings attended and reimbursement for of-
ficial travel expenses, as provided by law 
(5) The duties and responsibilities of the Personnel 
Review Board shall be 
(a) to serve as a quasi-judicial body to hear 
appeals from employees directly affected by ac 
tions taken under authority granted by this 
chapter to the director or to agencies on matters 
pertaining to promotions, dismissals, demotions, 
wages, salary, classification, violations of person-
nel rules, benefits, reductions in force, and disci-
plinary actions, 
(b) to serve as the final administrative appeal 
bod> to hear grievances brought by career service 
employees against agencies, as provided b> Sec 
tion 67-19-21, which have not been resolved at an 
earlier stage in the appeals process 
(6) The Personnel Review Board shall appoint one 
or more impartial hearing officers on a full-time or 
part-time basis, who shall have demonstrated b> edu 
cation and experience an ability to arbitrate and re 
solve personnel administration disputes and to han-
dle employee relations in a large work force 
(7) (a) The Personnel Review Board shall emplo> 
an executive secretary who shall have demon-
strated an ability to administer personnel poli-
cies and ma> appoint clerical assistance as 
needed The executive secretary shall have the 
power to 
d) subpoena witnesses, documents, or 
other evidence in conjunction with any in-
quiry, investigation, hearing, or other pro 
ceedmg and 
(n) determine an employee's standing to 
process his claim if he has been directly 
harmed, and also which issues may be heard 
The executive secretary may hold hearings, 
allow oral and written argument, and give 
parties an opportunity to be heard on these 
issues and shall within 15 days after the 
hearing issue a decision in writing The em-
ployee or the agency ma> appeal the execu-
tive secretary's decision to the district court 
where the employee lives or the district court 
of Salt Lake County within 20 days after re-
ceipt of the decision The notice of appeal 
shall state the grounds upon which error is 
claimed and the appeal shall be on the 
record 
(b) Employees of the Personnel Review Board 
shall be exempt from the career service provi-
sions of this chapter 
(8) Any member of the Personnel Review Board 
may administer oaths, certify official acts, and sub-
poena witnesses, documents, or other evidence in con-
junction with any inquiry, investigation, hearing, or 
other proceeding 1963 
67-19-21. Charges submissible under grievance 
and appeals procedure. 
(1) Any career service employee may submit a 
grievance based upon a claim or charge of injustice or 
oppression, including dismissal from employment, re-
sulting from an act, occurrence, omission, or condi-
tion for solution through the grievance procedures set 
forth in this chapter 
(2) (a) An aggrieved employee may appeal promo-
tions, dismissals, demotions, wages, salary, viola-
tion of personnel rules, issues concerning the eq-
uitable administration of benefits, reductions in 
force, and disciplinary actions to the Personnel 
Review Board and its hearing officers 
(b) No other matters may be appealed to the 
Personnel Review Board or its hearing officers 
(3) An aggrieved employee may appeal a determi-
nation regarding position classification and position 
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schedule assignments to the executive secretary of 
the Personnel Review Board 
(4) (a) With the exception of those actions de-
scribed in Subsections (2), (3), and (5), all other 
matters may be appealed by an employee to his 
department head 
(b) The decision of the department head is 
final 
(5) (a) Any employee of the state, other than an 
employee of a higher education institution, may 
submit a charge of a prohibited practice as de-
fined in Section 34-35-6 to his department head 
(b) If an employee does not agree with the de-
cision of the department head, he may file a com-
plaint with the Utah Antidiscrimination Divi-
sion 
(c) If the department head has not issued a de-
cision before the deadline for filing a complaint 
with the division, the employee may file directly 
with the commission and shall send a copy to the 
department head 
(d) The Personnel Review Board and its hear-
ing officers have no jurisdiction to consider these 
matters 1968 
67-19-21.1. P r o c e d u r e s — Adjudicat ive proceed-
ings. 
The Personnel Review Board shall comply with the 
procedures and requirements of Chapter 46b, Title 
63, in its adjudicative proceedings, except that the 
procedural time limits established in Chapter 19, Ti-
tle 67, supersede the procedural time limits of Chap-
ter 46b, Title 63 1987 
67-19-22. Employees ' r ights in gr ievance and 
appeals procedure. 
For the purpose of processing an appeal, an em-
ployee is entitled to 
(1) assistance by a representative of the em-
ployee's choice to act as an advocate at any level 
of the procedure, 
(2) a reasonable amount of time during work 
hours to confer with the representative and pre-
pare the grievance, 
(3) freedom from reprisals for use of the proce-
dure, and 
(4) call other employees as witnesses at an ap-
peal hearing and such employees shall be al-
lowed to attend and testify at the hearing if rea-
sonable advance notice is given to the witnesses' 
immediate supervisor 1S79 
67-19-23. Right of aggrieved employee to pro-
cess appeal to next step — Waiver or 
extension of appeal steps and time 
limits — Waiver of right to appeal fur-
ther. 
(1) Failure to answer an employee's appeal within 
the time specified automatically grants the aggrieved 
employee the right to process the appeal to the next 
step 
(2) Any appeal step, or any time limits specified at 
any step, may be waived or extended by mutual 
agreement in writing between the aggrieved em-
ployee and the person to whom the appeal is directed 
(3) Failure to process an appeal from one step to 
the next step within the time specified is deemed a 
waiver by the aggrieved employee of any nght to pro-
cess the appeal further or to appeal to any court, the 
appeal being deemed settled on the basis of the last 
Step 1979 
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67-19-24. Time limits for submission of appeal 
by aggrieved employee — Voluntary 
termination of employment 
(1) No appeal shall be submitted under this chap-
ter unless (a) it is submitted within 20 working days 
after the event giving rise to the appeal or (b) within 
20 working days after the aggrieved employee has 
knowledge of the event giving rise to the appeal 
(2) Notwithstanding Subsection (1Kb), no em-
ployee may submit an appeal more than one year 
after the event giving n s e to the appeal, nor does any 
person who has voluntarily terminated his or her em-
ployment with the state have any standing thereafter 
to submit an appeal 1979 
67-19-25. Procedura l s teps to be fo l lowed by ag-
grieved employee — Evidentiary and 
procedural rules — Appeal to Person-
nel Review Board — Appeal to district 
court 
(1) An aggrieved employee appealing an adminis-
trative action may observe the procedural steps set 
forth in this section only to the level permitted by 
Section 67-19-21 
(2) (a) An aggrieved employee shall first attempt 
to resolve a grievance through discussion with 
the employee's immediate supervisor 
(b) If the grievance submitted under Subsec-
tion (1) remains unanswered for five working 
days after submission, or if the aggrieved em-
ployee is dissatisfied with the decisions reached, 
the employee may resubmit the appeal, in writ-
ing, to his immediate supervisor within five 
working days after the expiration of the penod 
for answer or receipt of the decision, whichever is 
first 
(c) The immediate supervisor shall render a 
written decision under this step within five work-
ing days after submission of the appeal 
(d) The employee shall, upon submission of the 
appeal to the immediate supervisor, notify the 
executive secretary of the Personnel Review 
Board that the employee has initiated the appeal 
(e) Upon receipt of the notification of appeal, 
the executive secretary shall 
d) attempt to settle the complaint by con-
ference, conciliation, and persuasion, 
(n) determine whether or not the em-
ployee has standing to process a claim, 
(in) determine whether or not the em-
ployee has been directly harmed, and 
(iv) determine which issues may be heard 
(f) If the executive secretary finds that the 
grievance is authorized under Subsection 
67-19-21, it may be heard by the Personnel Re-
view Board or its heanng officer 
(g) If the executive secretary finds that the 
grievance is one that the agency is unable to re-
solve, he may, either on his own motion or with 
the concurrence of the employee and the agency, 
waive the requirement for a decision by the im-
mediate supervisor and under Subsections (3) 
and (4), procedure and submit the grievance di-
rectly to the hearing officer under Subsection (5) 
(h) He shall also attempt to resolve the dispute 
by informal means with the appropriate parties 
(3) (a) If the appeal submitted under Subsection 
(2) remains unanswered for five working days 
after submission, or if the aggrieved employee is 
dissatisfied with the decision reached, the em-
ployee may submit the appeal, in writing, to his 
second level supervisor within ten working days 
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after the expiration of the period for decision or 
receipt of the decision, whichever is first. 
(b) The second level supervisor shall issue a 
written decision under this step setting forth the 
reasons for decision within five working days af-
ter submission of the appeal. 
(4) (a) If the appeal submitted under Subsection 
(3) remains unanswered for five working days 
after submission, or if the aggrieved employee is 
dissatisfied with the decision reached, the em-
ployee may submit the appeal in writing to his 
department head within ten working days after 
the expiration of the period for decision or receipt 
of the decision, whichever is first. 
(b) The department head shall issue a written 
decision under this step setting forth the reasons 
for the decision within ten working days after 
submission of the appeal. 
(c) The decision of the department head shall 
be final in all matters except as provided in Sec-
tion 67-19-21. 
(5) (a) (i) If an appeal submitted under Subsection 
(4) that may be appealed to the hearing offi-
cer, under Section 67-19-21, remains unan-
swered for ten working days after submis-
sion, or if the aggrieved employee is dissatis-
fied with the decision reached, the employee 
may submit the appeal in writing to the ex-
ecutive secretary within ten working days 
after the expiration of the period for decision 
or receipt of the decision, whichever is first. 
(ii) Written notice of the time and place 
for hearing shall be given to the aggrieved 
employee at least five days before the date 
set for hearing. 
(iii) The executive secretary shall set the 
hearing not later than 15 days after submis-
sion of the grievance, or at a time agreed 
upon by the parties and the executive secre-
tary. 
(b) In those matters involving classification or 
position schedule assignment, the parties shall 
follow the procedures of this Subsection (5)(b). 
(i) Upon receipt of a notice of an appeal, 
the executive secretary shall refer the appeal 
to the director. 
(ii) The director shall assign the appeal to 
a classification panel of three or more impar-
tial persons trained in state classification 
procedures. 
(iii) The classification panel may: 
(A) obtain access to previous audits, 
classification decisions, and reports; 
(B) request new or additional audits 
by department or agency personnel ana-
lysts; and 
(C) consider new or additional infor-
mation. 
(iv) In making its determination, the clas-
sification panel shall determine whether or 
not the classification assignment was appro-
priate, and shall follow the statutes, rules, 
and procedures adopted by the division that 
were in effect at the time of the classification 
or schedule change. 
(v) The panel may sustain or modify the 
original decision or enter a new decision. 
(vi) The panel shall report its decision and 
findings to the director, who shall notify the 
appellant. 
(vii) Either party may appeal the panel's 
decision to a classification committee ap-
pointed by the director. 
(viii) The director shall appoint a classifi-
cation committee composed of three or more 
department directors representing both 
large and small agencies. 
(ix) The classification committee shall re-
view the classification and make the final 
decision. 
(c) (i) In all appeals to the hearing officer, a 
certified court reporter shall report the pro-
ceedings, or a suitable electronic recording 
device shall be used to record the proceeding. 
(ii) The transcript of the proceedings, to-
gether with all exhibits received during the 
hearing, is the record of the hearing. 
(iii) The hearing officer may subpoena 
witnesses and compel testimony in the con-
duct of the hearings. 
(d) (i) The state has the burden of proof in all 
appeals resulting from dismissals, demo-
tions, suspensions, and other disciplinary ac-
tions. 
(ii) The employee has the burden of proof 
in all other appeals. 
(e) The hearing officer shall issue his decision 
in writing. 
(f) In those appeals where the hearing officer 
does not issue a decision within 20 working days, 
the agency that is a party to the action is not 
liable for any claimed back wages or benefits 
from the expiration of the permitted time for is-
suing the decision to when the decision is issued. 
(6) (a) If no decision is issued under Subsection (5) 
within 20 working days after the hearing, or if 
either the aggrieved employee or the agency is 
dissatisfied with a decision on appeal from dis-
missal, or if the aggrieved employee, applicant, 
or agency alleges that a decision of the hearing 
officer was based on incorrect or arbitrary inter-
pretation of facts or that a matter of law is in 
dispute, the employee or agency may submit an 
appeal in writing, together with a transcript of 
the hearing conducted under Subsection (5), to 
the Personnel Review Board within ten working 
days after the expiration of the period of decision 
or upon receipt of the decision, whichever is first. 
(b) The board shall give written notice of the 
time and place for hearing to the employee and 
the agency at least five days before the date set 
for the hearing. 
(c) The board shall hold the hearing not later 
than 30 days after submission of the transcript. 
(d) The hearing before the Personnel Review 
Board shall be based upon the record as estab-
lished under Subsection (5). 
(e) The Personnel Review Board shall issue its 
written decision within 40 working days after the 
hearing. 
(f) If the board does not issue its written deci-
sion within 40 working days, the agency that is a 
party to the action is not liable for any claimed 
back wages or benefits from the expiration of the 
permitted time for issuing the decision until the 
decision is issued. 
(g) The board's decision is binding upon the 
agency. 
(h) The board may order that an employee be 
placed on the reappointment roster provided for 
in Section 67-19-17 for assignment to another 
agency. 
655 STATE OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES 67-20-3 
(7) (a) The aggrieved employee or the agency may 
appeal the decision of the Personnel Review 
Board to the district court of the district in which 
the position is located or to the district court of 
Salt Lake County within 20 days from the issu-
ance of the decision 
(b) On appeal to the district court, the board's 
findings of fact, if supported by substantial evi-
dence, are conclusive 
(8) (a) An applicant for a position in Utah s tate 
government who alleges prohibited practices in 
hir ing as defined in Section 34-35-6, may submit 
a complaint in writ ing to the depar tment head 
where the alleged action occurred 
(b) The depar tment head shall follow the pro-
cedures of Subsection (4) to determine the valid-
ity of the claim 
(c) If no decision is issued by the department 
head within ten days, or if the applicant is dissat-
isfied with the decision, the applicant may sub-
mit a complaint to the Utah Antidiscrimination 
Division pursuant to Subsection 67-19-21, within 
ten days from receipt of the decision or expiration 
of the time for a decision, whichever is first 1968 
67-19-26. Severability of provisions — Compli-
ance with requirements for federally 
aided programs. 
(1) If any provision of this chapter or of any regula-
tion or order issued thereunder or the application of 
any provision of this chapter to any person or circum-
stance is held m \ ahd, the remainder of this chapter 
and the application of provision of this chapter or 
regulation or orders issued under it to persons or cir-
cumstances other than those to which it is held in-
valid shall still be regarded as having the force and 
effect of law 
(2) If any par t of this chapter is found to be in con-
flict with federal requirements which are a condition 
precedent to the allocation of federal funds to the 
sta te , the conflicting par t of this chapter shall be in-
operative solely to the extent of the conflict and with 
respect to the agencies directly affected, and such 
findings shall not affect the operation of the remain-
der of this chapter in its application to the agencies 
concerned 
(3) Notwithstanding any provisions in this chapter 
to the contrary, no regulation shall be adopted which 
would deprive the state or any of its departments or 
institutions of federal grants or other forms of finan-
cial assistance, and the rules and regulations promul-
gated hereunder shall include standards, provisions, 
terms and conditions for personnel engaged in the 
administration of federally aided programs, which 
shall, in all respects, comply with the necessary re-
quirements for a qualified personnel system under 
the standards applicable to personnel engaged in the 
administration of federally aided programs 1979 
67-19-27. Leave of absence with pay for dis-
abled employees covered under other 
civil service systems. 
Any current or future employee in a position cov-
ered by the highway patrol or operator and chauffeur 
license examiners civil service systems a t the t ime of 
the effective date of this act, who is injured in the 
course of employment shall be given a leave of ab-
sence with full pay d u n n g the period of temporary 
disability This compensation shall be in lieu of all 
other compensation provided by law except hospital 
and medical services which are now or may hereafter 
be provided by law 
Any current or future employee in a position cov-
ered by the highway patrol civil service system a t the 
time of the effective date of this act, who is 100% 
disabled through a criminal act upon his person by 
the use of a deadly weapon while in the lawful dis-
charge of his duties shall be given a leave of absence 
with full compensation unti l he reaches the retire-
ment age of 62 years 1979 
67-19-28. Merger of civil service s y s t e m s . 
Prior to J a n u a r y 1, 1980, the director, after consul-
tation with the commissioner of public safety and the 
superintendent of the highway patrol, shall promul-
gate rules to effect the merger of the highway patrol 
and operator and chauffeur license examiners civil 
service systems with the provisions of this act Rules 
governing the s tandards of conduct and performance 
of employees shall t ake into account differences in 
responsibilities among varying classes of employees 
1979 
67-19-29. Violat ion a misdemeanor . 
Any person who knowingly violates a provision of 
this chapter is guilty of a class A misdemeanor 1979 
CHAPTER 20 
VOLUNTEER GOVERNMENT 
WORKERS ACT 
Section 
67-20-1 Short title 
67-20-2 Definitions 
67-20-3 Purposes for which volunteer considered a 
government employee 
67-20-4 Approval of \olunteer 
67-20-5 Repealed 
67-20-6 Workers' compensation benefits 
67-20-1. Short title. 
This chapter is known as the "Volunteer Govern-
ment Workers Act" 1986 
67-20-2. Definit ions. 
As used in this chapter 
(1) "Agency" means any department , institu-
tion, office, college, university, authori ty, divi-
sion, board, bureau, commission, council, or other 
agency of the state, or any county, city, town, 
school district, special improvement or taxing 
district, or any other political subdivision 
(2) "Community service worker" means any 
person who has been convicted of a criminal of-
fense, any youth who has been adjudged delin-
quent, or any person or youth who has been di-
verted from the c n m m a l or juvenile justice sys-
tem and who performs a public service for an 
agency as a condition of his sentence, diversion, 
probation, or parole 
(3) "Volunteer" means any person who donates 
service without pay or other compensation except 
expenses actually and reasonably incurred as ap-
proved by the supervising agency "Volunteer" 
does not include any person participating in 
human subjects research to the extent tha t the 
participation is governed by federal law or regu-
lation inconsistent with this chapter, nor does it 
include community service workers 1988 
67-20-3. Purposes for which volunteer consid-
ered a government employee. 
A volunteer is considered a government employee 
for purposes of 
DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT 
PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT RULES 
RULES R20-11-1 AND 2 
R20-11 DISCIPLIHE 
R20-11-1 Disciplinary action 
Noncompliance with these rules, departmental safety policies, professional 
standards adopted by a department, work place policies, and such matters as 
inefficiency, incompetency, failure to maintain skills or adequate performance 
levels, insubordination, disloyalty to the orders of a superior, misfeasance, 
malfeasance, or nonfeasance in office or to advance the good of the public 
interest shall be cause for disciplinary action. 
11-1.(1) The type and severity of any disciplinary action taken shall be 
governed by principles of due process to include: 
(l)(a) Consistent application 
(l)(b) Prior knowledge of rules and standards 
(l)(c) Determination of fact 
(l)(d) Timely notice of noncompliance 
(l)(e) Opportunity to respond and rebut as defined herein 
11-1.(2) If an agency head determines that a career service employee is 
charged with aggravated or repetitive misconduct or that retention 
of a career service employee would endanger the peace and safety of 
others or pose grave threat to the public interest, the agency 
head, pending an Investigation to determine fact upon which 
disciplinary action may be taken, may utilize one or more of the 
following options: 
(2)(a) The employee may be placed on administrative paid leave for up 
to thirty working days. If more time is needed beyond thirty 
working days, written authorization must be obtained from the 
Director. 
(2)(b) The employee may be temporarily reassigned to another position 
and/or different work location at the same rate of pay pending 
the completion of the investigation. 
11-1.(3) In all cases, except as provided under 67-19-18(2) UCA, 
disciplinary action includes the following: 
(3)(a) The agency representative notifies the employee in writing of 
the proposed discipline and the reasons therefore; 
(3)(b) The employee has five working days within which to reply in 
writing and have the reply considered by the agency 
representative before discipline is imposed; 
(3)(c) An employee waives the right to respond and discipline may be 
imposed without a response if the employee does not reply 
within the time frames stated in these rules or as established 
by the agency representative, whichever is greater. 
11-1 
11-1.(4) After an employee has been informed of the reasons for the 
proposed discipline and has been given an opportunity to 
respond and be responded to, discipline may be imposed by the 
agency representative as appropriate. The type and severity 
of discipline may take into consideration the severity of the 
occurrence, the repeated nature of violations, prior 
disciplinary actions, previous oral warnings and discussions, 
the employee's past work record, the effect on agency 
operations and potential of the violations for causing damage 
to persons or property. Disciplinary action may include one 
or more of the following options: 
(4)(a) Written reprimand 
(4)(b) Suspension of the employee without pay up to thirty calendar 
days per occurrence requiring discipline. 
(4)(c) Demotion of the employee utilizing one of the following 
methods as provided by law (67-19-18): 
(1) An employee may be moved from a position in one class to a 
position in another class having a lower entrance salary if 
the duties of the position have been reduced for disciplinary 
reasons. 
(2) When duties of the position have not changed an employee's 
salary shall be reduced by moving the employee back in the 
range, as determined by the department head or designee. 
(4)(d) A department head shall dismiss or demote an employee only in 
accordance with the provision of 67-19-18(3) UCA 1953 as 
amended. (See R20-11-2 of these rules.) 
(4)(e) Disciplinary actions are subject to the grievance and appeals 
procedure provided by law. 
11-1.(5) At the time disciplinary action is imposed the employee shall be 
notified of the discipline, the reasons for the discipline, the 
effective date and length of the discipline and the standard of 
conduct necessary to avoid further discipline. 
R20-11-2 Dismissal or demotion 
An employee may be dismissed or demoted for cause as explained in Section 
10-2 and 11-1 of these rules as follows: 
11-2.(1) An agency head may dismiss an employee having other than career 
service status, without right of appeal, for cause upon providing 
written notification to the employee specifying the reasons for the 
dismissal and the effective date. 
11-2 
11-2.(2) No person shall be dismissed or demoted from a career service 
position unless the department head or designee has observed the 
following procedures and the Grievance Procedure Rules: 
(2)(a) The department head or designee shall notify the employee in 
writing of the specific reasons for the dismissal or demotion. 
(2)(b) The employee shall have no less than five working days to 
reply and have the reply considered by the department head. 
(2)(c) The employee shall have an opportunity to be heard by the 
department head or designee. 
(2)(d) Following such a hearing an employee may be dismissed or 
demoted if the department head finds adequate cause or reason. 
11-2.(3) A department head or designee may suspend an employee pending the 
administrative appeal to the department head as provided by law 
(67-19-18(2) UCA). 
11-3 
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brief or memorandum of law prior to the hearing. 
RC65-1-23. PaWk Hearings 
The parties shall be entitled to an open and public 
hearing unless the exclusion rule is invoked or unless 
there are grounds to justify an executive session. 
23.1 Closing Hearings. All Grievance Procedure 
hearings may be open to the public, except for sit-
uations in which the Administrator, the Board, or 
the Hearing Officer closes by executive session either 
a portion of the hearing or the entire hearing when 
substantial reason exists for not having an open 
hearing, or in cases where the employee so requests. 
(Reference: Attorney General Opinion No. 79-366 
and the Utah Open and Public Meetings Act.) 
23.1.1 An evidentiary /Step 5 hearing may be 
closed in part or in its entirety when the proceeding 
involves questions about an employee's character, 
professional competence, or physical or mental 
health. (Reference: Utah Open and Public Meetings 
Act Manual, p. 15.) 
23.2 Sealing Evidence. The Administ rator, the 
Board, or the Hearing Officer can exercise authority 
to seal the evidence when circumstances so warrant. 
23.3 Media Presence. All hearings at the evident-
iary/Step 5 and appellate/Step 6 levels are open 
to the media, unless otherwise closed due to rule 
23.1 above, except that television cameras shall not 
be permitted at the evidentiary/Step 5 proceedings. 
23.4 Dissemination. The Administrator has disc-
retion to release copies of legal decisions, orders, 
and rulings to media representatives upon the 
latter's request. Portions of or entire legal decisions 
and orders may be withheld if deemed to be of a 
sensitive, privileged, or highly confidential nature. 
R665-1-24. Declaratory Rulings 
This rule provides a procedure for submission and 
review of, and requests for, disposition of, declar-
atory rulings on the applicability of statutes, admi-
nistrative rules, and orders either governing or 
issued by the Board or the Administrator. 
24.1 Definition. A declaratory ruling is an admi-
nistrative interpretation or explanation of rights, 
status, or other legal relations under a statute, rule, 
or order. 
24.1.1 Applicability. The applicability of a decl-
aratory ruling refers to the determination of whether 
a statute, rule, or order should be applied, and if 
so, how the law should be applied to the facts. 
24.2 Petition Procedure. Any person or agency 
with proper standing may petition for a declaratory 
ruling. 
24.2.1 The petition shall be addressed and deliv-
ered to the Administrator. 
24.2.2 The petition shall be date-stamped upon 
receipt in the PRB Office. 
24.3 Petition Form. The petition shall: 
24.3.1 Be clearly designated as a request for a 
declaratory ruling. 
24.3.2 Identify the statute, rule, or order to be 
reviewed. 
24.3.3 Describe the circumstances in which appl-
icability is to be reviewed. 
24.3.4 Describe the reason or need for the appli-
cability review. 
24.3.5 Include an address and telephone number 
where the petitioner can be reached during regular 
work days. 
24.3.6 Be signed by the petitioner. 
24.4 Petition Review and Disposition. As appro-
priate the Administrator or the Board shall: 
24.4.1 Review and consider the petition. 
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24.4.2 Prepare a declaratory ruling, stating: (1) 
the applicability or non-applicability of the statute, 
rule, or order at issue; (2) the reasons for the appl-
icability or non-applicability of the statute, rule, or 
order; and (3), any requirements imposed on a pet-
itioning person or agency, or any other person acc-
ording to the ruling. 
24.4.3 The Administrator or the Board may: (1) 
interview the petitioner or the agency representative; 
(2) hold a public hearing on the petition; (3) consult 
with legal counsel or the Attorney General; or (4) 
take any action which the Board, in its judgment 
deems necessary in order to provide the petition 
with an adequate review and due consideration. 
24.5 Time Frame and Service. The Board or the 
Administrator shall prepare the declaratory ruling 
without unnecessary delay and shall send the petiti-
oner a copy of the ruling by certified mail or by the 
State's Central Mailing system, as appropriate, or 
shall send the petitioner notice of progress in prep-
aring the ruling, within 30 days of receipt of the 
petition. 
24.6 Records. The PRB Office shall retain the 
petition and the original of the declaratory ruling in 
its records. 
24.7 Board Initiated Rulings. The Board on its 
own motion may issue a declaratory order to term-
inate a controversy or to remove uncertainty. 
24.8 Statutory Construction. Questions requiring 
the construction of statutory provisions shall be 
submitted to the Attorney General for a formal or 
informal letter opinion. 
24.9 The Board or the Administrator may refuse 
to issue a declaratory ruling if the question in issue 
is one that is being contested in a case air eady 
before the Board. 
24.10 Status of Rulings. A declaratory ruling has 
the same status and binding effect as any other 
ruling or order by the Board or the Administrator. 
R665-1-25. Evidentiary/Step 5 Hearings 
25.1 Hearing Officers. The Administrator is aut-
horized to appoint Hearing Officers to preside over 
hearings, receive evidence, conduct informal admi-
nistrative proceedings, and issue written decisions in 
accordance with these rules. Hearing Officers shall 
be compensated for each case, pursuant to personal 
service contracts. 
25.1.1 Hearing Officers shall conduct hearings in 
a manner prescribed by these rules. 
25.2 Authority of Hearing Officers. The Hearing 
Officer shall conduct a fair and impartial hearing 
and shall: 
25.2.1 Administer oaths and affirmations, unlesf 
such administering is delegated to a court reporter. 
25.2.2 Maintain order, insure the development o 
a clear and complete record, rule upon offers o 
proof, and receive relevant evidence. 
25.2.3 Regulate the course and conduct of tb 
hearing, set times for the filing of document/ 
provide for the taking of testimony by deposition c 
affidavit if necessary, examine any witness in orck 
to clarify issues, and direct witnesses to testify. 
25.2.4 Limit the number of times any witness mi 
testify; limit immaterial, repetitious, or cumulate 
testimony; set reasonable limits on the amount i 
time each witness may testify and be era 
examined; maintain decorum and exclude any (ft 
uptive persons; designate the order of examinirk 
of witnesses; limit the scope of examination ai 
cross-examination; and exclude from being pre* 
any witness being present as an observer, wh( 
Coosa 
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determine whether such a proceeding is justifiable, 
and whether it will be held on the record. Any 
appeal from a subsequent reconsideration determi-
nation issued by the original Hearing Officer must 
be filed with the Administrator within 10 working 
days of the most recently issued determination. 
R665-1-26. The Board and The Appellate 
Procedure 
26.1 Board Members' Terms. The Board shall 
consist of five members, each appointed by the 
Governor, for four year terms or portions thereof. 
26.1.1 Three Board members* terms shall be co-
terminous with the Governor's term and two 
members' terms shall begin January 1, of the third 
year of the Governor's regular term in office. 
26.1.2 The Board members shall hold office until 
their successors are appointed. 
26.1.3 The Board members shall be persons qua-
lified by knowledge of the field of administrative 
procedures and merit principles in public employ-
ment. 
26.2 Political Affiliation. No Board member shall 
be a member of any local, State or national comm-
ittee of a political party nor serve as an officer or 
member of a committee in any partisan political 
club, nor hold or be a candidate for any paid public 
office. 
26.2.1 No more than three Board members shall 
be from the same political party. 
26.3 Organization. The Board shall be organized 
as follows: 26.3.1 The Governor shall annually 
designate one of the Board members to serve as 
chairman. 
26.3.2 Any three Board members shall constitute 
a quorum to conduct business, to hear appeals, and 
to make decisions. 
26.3.3 The actions of a majority of those present 
at a Board hearing, at which a quorum is present, 
shall be actions of the Board. 
26.3.4 Board members may only be removed for 
cause by the Governor. 
26.3.5 Absence from three consecutive Board 
meetings without valid reason may constitute cause 
for removal. 
26.3.6 Each Board member shall receive a per 
diem payment for official meetings, hearings, and 
Board activities, and reimbursement for travel exp-
enses, as provided by State law. 
26.4 Duties and Responsibilities. The Board is the 
final administrative body that reviews appeals from 
employees or agencies pertaining to promotions, 
dismissals, demotions, wages, salary, benefits, red-
uctions in force, and disciplinary actions which have 
not been resolved at an earlier stage in the appeals 
process. 
26.4.1 The Board is a quasi-judicial body which 
functions at an appellate level of the State's Griev-
ance Procedure. 
26.5 Authority. The Board shall have authority to 
subpoena witnesses, documents, or other evidence in 
conjunction with any inquiry, investigation, hearing 
or other proceeding. 
26.5.1 Any Board member may administer oaths 
and certify official acts. 
26.5.2 The Board may, at its discretion, order 
that an employee be placed on the reappointment 
roster as provided for at Utah Code Annotated 
Section 67-19-17, for assignment to another 
agency. 
26.6 Briefs. An appeal hearing before the Board 
will be based upon die evidentiary record previously 
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established by the Hearing Officer. No additional or 
new evidence is permitted. 
26.6.1 The Appellant in a Step 6 proceeding must 
obtain the t ranscript of the Step 5 hearing. (Refer 
to rule 15.6.) After receipt of the transcript, the 
Appellant has a 10 working day period to file six 
copies of a brief with the Administrator. Addition-
ally, the Respondent must be provided with a copy 
of the Appellant's brief. 
26.6.2 Upon receipt of a copy of the Appellant's 
brief, the Respondent then has a 10 working day 
period to file six copies of a reply brief with the 
Administrator. 
26.6.3 Briefs are to be distributed to Board 
members within approximately 20 days after avail-
ability of the transcript. The Board will then ende-
avor to schedule a hearing within the third 10 day 
period. Hence, from the date of formal filing until 
the Board hearing, approximately 30 days shall have 
elapsed. 
26.6.4 All briefs must be hand delivered or sent 
U.S. Postal Service postage prepaid, unless the 
State's Central Mailing system is used. 
26.6.5 Briefs will be date stamped upon receipt in 
the PRB Office. 
26.6.6 All briefs must be received in the PRB 
Office before the appeal hearing/Step 6 can be 
scheduled. 
26.6.7 The time frame for receiving briefs shall be 
modified or waived only for good cause as determ-
ined by the Administrator. 
26.7 Rules of Procedure. The following rules are 
applicable to appeal hearings before the Board: 
26.7.1 Dismissal of Appeal. Upon a motion by 
either party or upon its own motion, the Board may 
dismiss any appeal prior to holding a formal appeal 
hearing if the appeal is clearly moot, without merit, 
not properly filed or not within the scope of the 
Board's authority. 
26.7.2 Notice. Written notice of the date, time, 
place and issues for hearing by the Board shall be 
given to the aggrieved employee, to the employee's 
counsel or representative, to the agency, and to the 
agency's counsel or representative, at least 5 days 
before the date set for the hearing. 
26.7.3 Compelling Evidence. The Board may 
compel evidence in the conduct of its appeals and 
may remand cases to the original Hearing Officer 
for additional evidence, as appropriate. 
26.7.4 Oral Argument/Time Limitation. As a 
general rule, the Board will restrict the oral argu-
ment portion of a proceeding to 30 minutes, or less, 
per party. The Board may grant additional time as it 
deems appropriate. 
26.7.5 Oral Argument Set Aside. If the Board 
determines that oral argument is unnecessary, the 
parties shall be so notified, but are expected to 
appear before the Board on the date and time set in 
order to answer any questions raised by the Board 
members. 
26.7.6 Oral argument or written memoranda may 
be required of the parties at the Board's discretion. 
26.8 Standards of Review. The Board's decisions 
shall be based upon the following: 
26.8.1 The Board's appellate decisions shall be 
supported by credible substantial evidence. 
26.8.2 The Board's standards of review consist of 
determining: (1) whether the Hearing Officer's evi-
dentiary decision was supported by substantial evi-
dence; (2) whether that decision is warranted by the 
facts and circumstances of the case on appeal; and 
(3) whether the Hearing Officer's findings of fact 
CODE«C0 
Prow. U»b 
UTAH PERSONNEL REVIEW BOARD 
GLOSSARY OF TERMS 
APPENDIX B 
A P P E N D I X B 
G L O S S A R Y 
Admission: A statement ( including an action or omission) that i s inconsistent 
wi th a party1 s in terest , defense, or al legat ion, and that may be offered 
against that party t o prove or disprove a material f ac t . 
Al legation: An assertion made by a party i n a legal/administrative 
proceeding, which the party t r i e s t o prove. 
Arbi t rary: An act performed capriciously; done without adequate determining 
p r inc ip le ; not done according t o sound reason or judgment; depending on w i l l 
alone, without f a i r , so l i d , and substantial cause. (See Capricious.) 
Arguendo: For purposes of making an argument, a presumption that certa in 
facts or pr inciples are t rue. 
Argumentative Question: A question not intended to e l i c i t fac ts , but rather 
t o present or create an argument. 
Bona f i de : In good f a i t h ; legal ly va l id ; without deceit or fraud. 
Capricious: Motivated or acting on whim or impulse; unpredictable. (See 
Ait i traryD 
Character Evidence: Evidence about a person's t r a i t s or qua l i t ies , usually 
offered through opinion testimony or testimony as t o reputation. 
Circumstantial Evidence: Evidence which i s of an ind i rect nature from which 
the existence or non-existence of a material fact may be in fer red. (Compare 
with Direct Evidence.) 
Col latera l Estoppel: A legal doctrine holding that legal and factual issues 
that were resolved i n one proceeding may be viewed as conclusively established 
i n a l a te r proceeding under cer ta in circumstances. For example, an employee's 
p r i o r cr iminal conviction may estop that employee from denying the factual 
basis of the cr iminal proceeding. (Compare with Res Judicata.) 
Competency: The presence of those characterist ics (or the absence of those 
d i sab i l i t i es ) that render a witness legal ly f i t and qual i f ied to give 
testimony. Applies i n a s imi lar sense t o documents or other objects of 
evidence. Describes evidence that i s admissible by the t r i e r of fact 
(presiding o f f i c i a l ) i n determining questions of fac t . Competency relates to 
the personal qua l i f i ca t i ons ) of the witness; c red ib i l i t y relates to the 
witness's truthfulness. 
Corroborating Evidence: Evidence supplementary to evidence already submitted 
and tending t o strengthen and confirm i t . 
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and go for 20 minutes. 
KEVIN GRAY, 
having been first duly sworn, was called as a 
witness by the Respondent and testified upon his 
oath as follows: 
MR. 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
the 
A 
Q 
A 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
SANDERS: 
Would you state your name for the record, please? 
My name is Kevin Gray. 
Last name is spelled? 
G-r-a-y. 
Thank you. Mr. Gray, are you currently employed 
Department of Corrections? 
Yes, sir, I am. 
In what capacity? 
I'm the training coordinator for the Department of 
Corrections. 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
worked 
How long have you held that position? 
Approximately 24 months. 
Prior to that what position did you hold? 
Prior to coming to the Department of Corrections I 
for the University of Utah in the Parking Services 
Division. Handled the supervisory function there. 
Q 
A 
Did you perform any training duties there? 
Yes, sir, I did. 
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* Q Prior to that position where were you working? 
2 A For one year prior to the University I worked for 
3 Mr. Lynn Lund in his law firm as a correctional consultant 
4
 and provided jail training around the Western United 
5 States. And prior to that I worked for eight years with 
6 the Salt Lake County Sheriff's office in the jail division. 
7 Primary function after about 1975 was director of training 
8 and personnel and handled all the training responsibilities 
9 for the jail. 
10 I Q Have you had any other experience in training? 
n | A Yes, sir, I'm a consultant with the National 
12 Institute of Corrections and have traveled around the 
13 country training jail officers and correctional officers in 
14 I jail operations. I've been a consultant for the Bureau of 
15 Indian Affairs, and I was a consultant with the firm of 
16 DeLand & Associates provided, again, correctional 
17 consultation and training to jails around the country. 
18 Q So, approximately just roughly how many years of 
19 training or training management experience have you had? 
20 | A From approximately 1975 to the present, about 12 
21 I years, 
Q This has been your primary function? 
A Yes. 
24 , Q Would you describe the responsibilities you 
25 I currently perform, what types of duties are normal for you? 
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 A The present duties that I have with the Department 
2
 of Corrections for the operation of the pre-service 
3
 academy, which is the certification course for all 
correctional officers. We run a nine-week certification 
5
 course making certain that the curriculum is up to the 
6
 level that it needs to be, that the subject matter that 
7
 we're teaching is relevant to corrections, and that those 
8 people who are involved in the training as participants are 
9 meeting all of the requirements for graduation. 
10 Q Do you ever teach classes yourself? 
11 A I teach a number of classes in preservice and I 
12 have taught a number of classes in inservice training, 
13 Q Would you differentiate between these two for the 
14 Court just as a matter of explanation. 
15 A Inservice training is the training that follows up 
16 after basic training. And it is required by state law for 
17 all certified officers to receive a minimum of 20 hours of 
18 inservice training each year. 
19 Q Have you ever taught a class on the abuse of 
20 force? 
21 A Yes, I have. 
22 Q Did you teach a class — did you teach this class 
23 in February of 1986? 
24 A I do recall teaching it from the document that you 
25 I have there. 
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1 Q Would you identify this document, please? 
2 A For each inservice class that we teach we have a 
3 participant sign-up sheet and all people who attend that 
4 particular class are required to sign their name showing 
5 that they were in attendance at the class. The document 
6 also shows the title of the class, the dates, who the 
7 J instructor was, where it was taught and the total number of 
g , hours 
9 l Q Is there a particular name that's been highlighted 
on that sheet? 
A Yes, sir. 
Q Would you identify that, please? 
A It appears to be P.S. Sucher. 
Q Would you identify that individual, please? 
A Mr. Sucher is seated across the way from me. 
Q Its your testimony that Mr. Sucher was in 
attendance at that class? 
A As far as I can recall he was there, yes. 
Q Would you very briefly describe this course? 
A This course is on use and abuse of force. And the 
— let me take out my — 
Q Perhaps, Mr. Gray, would you perhaps identify this 
document. We can save some time that way. 
A This is the handout and lesson plan that I use for 
that particular class. 
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Q How do you know that this was for that particular 
class? 
A It's the only use and abuse of force class taught 
in the institution. I'm the only instructor and I prepared 
that document. 
Q So, it is your testimony these are the notes, 
handouts? 
A And lesson plan. 
Q And lesson plan that you used in that particular 
course? 
A Yes, sir. 
Q Very briefly, could you describe the nature of 
this course, what is taught? Just basically give a 
narrative of what the course itself involves. 
A The principal behind this particular course is to 
instruct the officer on some of the reasons that force is 
used, when force can be used in an institution, to instruct 
the officers on the theory that the minimum amount of force 
is what is required in handling inmates in any given 
situation. It discusses some of the causes for the abuse 
of force and some of the consequences that a correctional 
officer may face if excessive force is used in any 
situation. 
Q What types of consequences would be potentially 
involved in an abuse case? 
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1
 A We instruct the officers during this particular 
2
 class that the types of consequences could range anywhere 
3
 J from a verbal reprimand to termination, lawsuits filed by 
the inmates for cruel and unusual punishment, and even 
5 criminal charges in the event that the offense was serious 
6
 enough• 
7
 Q What makes the difference in terms of — this one 
8 seems to run the whole gamut. What would be the 
9 difference, the factors that would be considered? 
10 A In what type of — 
11 Q In making a determination if discipline is 
12 appropriate? 
13 A Well, I believe one of the factors would be 
14 violation of policy and procedure. If there was in fact a 
15 violation of policy and procedure, if there was a violation 
16 of state law, or if there was a violation of an inmate's 
17 civil rights would all have an affect on determining what 
18 level of consequences the officer may face. 
Q Would the condition of the inmate be considered as 
a factor in this? 
A Obviously if the inmate is seriously injured as a 
19 
20 
21 
22 result then force is even more excessive« 
23 
24 
Q What about the condition of the inmate in terms of 
his ability to defend himself, for instance, whether or not 
25 he was shackled, handcuffed, et cetera? 
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A If the inmate was fully restrained at the time, 
then his ability to resist and therefore protect himself 
would be at a very minimum. And that would even make the 
force excessive. 
Q Okay. Very briefly, if you would just describe 
I for the Court what this document contains and so on. 
7 l
 A The lesson plan is — as I mentioned earlier talks 
8
 I about how corrections is evolved, how force in early 
9
 corrections was basically left up to the administration. 
10
 I The Court did not have much to do with what was done in 
institutions. How over the years as society has changed 
12 I its philosophy on dealing with prisoners they have been 
13 shocked at some of the things that went on in institutions 
14
 with abuse of prisoners and cruel and unusual punishment. 
15
 J So, this change came about because of those and 
required that the officers use only a minimum amount of 
i? I force in dealing with the prisoners. It goes on to discuss 
18
 a continuum of force showing the least amount of force 
19 working up to the ultimate force, which is that of deadly 
20 force, 
21 Q Were any handouts prepared to describe that 
22 continuum of force? 
23 A Yes, there were. 
24 Q Ifm going to show you two documents. Would you 
25 J identify these, please? 
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 A The two documents are very similar. One is the 
2 least restrictive alternative. 
3 Q I believe that's contained in the packet, Your 
4
 Honor, approximately two or three pages in. 
5 A It is a step approach to the use of force. 
6 Minimum amount of force being taught. The greatest amount 
7 of force being strike, and the second document is abuse of 
8 force continuum. That discusses in greater detail each one 
g J of the steps and the least restrictive alternative from 
10 i talk up to and including deadly force. 
n Q I believe there are about, perhaps, two or three 
12 pages. If I may approach the bench. 
13 
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Mr. Gray, on that continuum at what point is a 
14 I staff member essentially authorized to strike an inmate? 
15 i A There would be a number of situations that would 
16 I determine if a staff member could strike. One, it would be 
17 determined by what level the inmate is on. If the inmate 
18 I is on the same level such as a striking the officer, the 
officer has the right to protect and defend himself. 
If there are more than one inmate involved in the 
situation the officer may have to use more force in 
protecting himself. If there are weapons involved the 
officer would be allowed to use more force than would 
normally be necessary for one inmate with no weapons. 
The number of officers involved would determine on 
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how much force is used. Generally more officers involved 
2
 I required less force. 
Q So, as the number of essentially staff goes up 
force should drop down. 
5
 A Yes, sir. 
6
 Q With the one condition of the inmate, again, 
7
 whether or not he is restrained? 
8 A Yes. Restrained is about midway up the force 
9 continuum and if you have the inmate restrained, then, that 
10 would be the least amount of force used. Anything over and 
11 above that would be excessive. 
12 Q I notice at the — on the one page noted, called 
13 the use of force continuum there are certain words which 
14 are typed in underneath the words such as touch, hold, and 
15 so on. Would you describe why these are included there? 
16 A It is a gradual process of escalation. The least 
17 amount of force that anybody can use is to talk to someone. 
18 Then as you progress or it escalates you get into touching, 
19 placing holds on a prison, moving a prisoner from place to 
20 place. 
21 Then moving up higher on the scale, strike, where 
22 you actually have to strike an inmate, or the use of deadly 
23 force. In this case would be firearms or night sticks that 
24 might be employed. 
25 Q Mr. Gray, as part of the process do you talk about 
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when force is appropriate in terms of the actions — the 
possible actions and so on? 
A We — when we discuss this particular issue we 
instruct the officers that they should be on the level that 
the inmate is on and no higher. But once any danger has 
passed, then any force that's used is abusive. So, if the 
inmate is — has stopped his aggressiveness and is no 
longer in the attacking mode, then anything that the 
officer does above and beyond that may be excessive. 
Q Let me create a hypothetical and ask you to judge, 
if you will. An inmate has been acting out. He's been 
struggling. However, at this point he has been handcuffed. 
He's been placed in restraints and is being carried by 
staff. He then without any action at that time — what 
action would be justified — 
MR. SUCHER: I object. That requires a judgment 
and that's the finders of fact — 
MR. SANDERS: Yes, sir. I believe we've qualified 
this witness as an expert in the area of training. 
THE COURT: He's well qualified. 
A Would you please restate your question. 
Q Creating a hypothetical, if an inmate has been 
acting out, kicking, et cetera, and then has been 
restrained with both physical restraints and by a number of 
officers with other officers in the area, if an inmate did 
53 
11 
1
 something at that point, acted out, kicked, spit, what 
2 action would be appropriate? 
3
 A Probably no more than restraining him with the 
4
 number of officers that are involved. The inmate would be 
5 easily restrained at that point without using any more 
6 force. When you're talking restraints you're talking about 
7 what? Handcuffs, leg irons? 
8 Q Handcuffs, leg irons, plus being held. 
9 A Yeah, that would be about as high as you would go 
10 J unless, of course, the inmate broke loose, was able to get 
out of the restraints. Then that would be a different 
12 I matter. 
13 Q Mr. Gray, I'll ask you to refer to page 4 of the 
t4 terms. There's a phrase, I believe it's the next to the 
15 J bottom on the right-hand side. Phrase is, "After the 
danger is over force that is used becomes abusive." Would 
17 I you explain that phrase? 
18 J A Just a very simple theory that is general in most 
law enforcement where we find most of our problems occur is 
that after the inmate or the suspect has been restrained 
and there is no longer any danger to the officer, the 
people around him, any kind of force used over and above 
that restraint or that level of force that the inmate is on 
would be classified as abusive. 
Q I notice that on the left-hand side of these 
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1 documents there are certain phrases put in there, I 
2 believe, under the title Instructor's Notes. Would you 
3 explain what these are, please? 
4
 A In the lesson plan development there are basically 
5 two columns, the instructor notes and the contents. The 
6 instructor notes are just reminders to the instructor to 
7 make sure that they emphasized that particular portion of 
8 the content. 
9 I Q How many times have you taught this class? 
A I would have to say that this particular class I 
have instructed at least 50 times. 
Q Is it your normal procedure to outline fairly 
10 
11 
12 
13 extensively? 
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A Yes. Yes, sir. 
Q On the next page, page 5, the one, two, three, 
fourth printout down there's a statement, "Enforcing 
17 regulations minimal force should be used since danger of it 
becoming corporal punishment is greater in these 
situations." 
A The law allows institutions to use force in 
controlling inmates and to use force to enforce rules and 
regulations. It's a very fine line that they draw here 
because the courts have come out and repeatedly said that 
corporal punishment is not allowed in institutions. 
Q By "corporal punishment," please define the term 
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1
 the way you would use it. 
2
 A Corporal punishment is any kind of physical 
3
 J punishment or physical — any type of physical activity 
that would denote punishment. In the early days it was 
5
 things from whipping posts and racks and sweat boxes to 
6
 actual physical abuse such as beatings and whippings and so 
7
 on. 
8 Q Okay. If you had to summarize your course what 
9 would you say about it? What — how long did this course 
10 take? 
11 A This course is approximately two hours and has 
12 most recently been expanded to a three-hour block. 
13 Q Are there any handouts provided to staff? 
14 A Yes. We normally pass out a — an outline of the 
15 course, which is the first two pages or three pages of the 
16 document. The handout on the least restrictive 
17 alternative, the handout on the causes of the abuse of 
18 force, and the force continuum. 
19 Q Do you use any examples in this course? 
20 A This particular course has some practical problems 
21 that are used. Depending on the time allotment and if 
22 they're — if we have not expired all the time we can go 
23 into some practical situations using some prepared policy 
24 and procedure as our guidelines. 
Q Okay. Do you remember, realizing itfs been two 25 
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i years, do you remember whether or not these were used in 
2 that course? 
3 A I do not recall if we were able to get into the 
4 actual practical on this particular course. Normally we 
5 divide the group into — the class into several groups. I 
6 think we were able to do it with this class but being that 
7 it was almost two years ago I don't recall for sure. 
Q Do you remember if the handouts were provided to 
g I individuals that day? 
A Off the top of my head, no, I cannot recall that 
the handouts were there for the class. 
Q Do you have any reason to believe that the 
handouts were not provided? 
A No, I don't. 
Q Is it your normal procedure to provide those to 
staff? 
A Yes, it is. 
Q Mr. Gray, let me turn to just training in general. 
Are staff provided with any training on defensive tactics? 
A Yes, they are. 
Q When was this training started? 
A The defensive tactics arrest and control course 
was begun in July of 1986 and has continued during each 
inservice training year since. 
Q Are individuals of the captain and lieutenant rank 
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1
 invited to attend that training? 
2 A Yes, they are. 
3 Q Why? 
4
 A It is training that's useful for all members of 
5 the department that deal with inmates.. 
6 Q Has the training process within the Department of 
7 Corrections changed in recent years? 
8 A Yes, it has, 
9 Q How so? 
10 J A When I began in 1985 we began to make changes by 
11 I implementing needs assessments where we would contact 
12 | officers, have them tell us some of the things they thought 
13 I were essential to the training process. We have begun to 
14 J develop an instructor corps, standardized lesson plans, and 
a standardized curriculum for both inservice and 
16 l preservice. 
17 Q So, these training — the training materials now 
18 are what would you say, more extensive? 
19 A Yes, much more extensive than they were when I 
20 began my employment. 
21 | Q Is there any reason why this has happened? 
22 | A Well, the main reason is that there is a great 
need for training. An officer cannot do his job properly 
unless he's adequately trained and court case after court 
case has come out citing the need for training. Officers 
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23 
24 
25 
58 
1
 especially in corrections. 
2 Q Let me turn next to your history. You mentioned 
3 you had worked in the Salt Lake County Jail. 
4
 A Uh-huh (affirmative). 
5 Q During that time were you ever spit upon by an 
6 inmate? 
7 A I do not recall being spit upon by an inmate. I 
8 do recall having urine thrown in my face on at least two 
9 ( occasions. 
Q What did you do? 
A We restrained the inmate. We had three or four 
officers went into the cell, brought the inmate out of the 
cell, and put him in what we call behavior modification, 
14 | which is an isolation, submitted disciplinary reports and 
turned it over to the disciplinary committee. 
Q Have you ever had to physically hit an inmate? 
A No, sir, I have not. 
Q Have you ever had to use physical restraints on an 
inmate? 
A Yes, sir, I have. 
Q Would you describe the difference between these 
22 I two, the circumstances? 
A In the physical restraint it was just taking hold 
of the inmate, restraining his arms, holding him to the 
floor with — more often than not there was more than one 
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7 
officer involved. 
Q Have you ever been kicked by an inmate? 
A Yes, I have. 
Q What action did you take then? 
5
 J A We restrained the inmate, moved him into 
isolation, and submitted disciplinary reports. 
Q Just once more to clarify for me, when you taught 
8 I the class on abuse of force was Mr. Sucher present? 
9
 A As far as I can recall, yes, he was. 
10 MR. SANDERS: Thank you. No further questions at 
11 this time, Your Honor. 
12 THE COURT: Do you wish to cross-examine this 
13 witness? 
14 MR. SUCHER: Yes, sir. 
15 THE COURT: Go ahead. Ask him what you want but I 
16 think it's clear that you have a training program, probably 
17 very good, and Mr. Sucher attended one class, anyway. I 
18 don't know that additional information is needed. 
19 MR. SUCHER: I think it is. 
20 CROSS-EXAMINATION 
21 BY MR. SUCHER: 
22 Q Kevin, one of the criteria required in the 
23 Department of Procedure manual for training to be valid is 
24 that there is pre and post-tests on the subject matter 
25 J presented in the course. Was that done in this case? 
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HEARING OFFICER DECISION 
PAUL S. SUCHER v. DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS 
6 PRB/H.O. 88(1988) 
BEFORE THE PERSONNEL REVIEW BOARD OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
OV.C3
 c 
In the Matter of: 
: FINDINGS OF FACT 
PAUL S. SUCHER, 
Grievant, : CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, 
v. : DECISION AND ORDER 
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS. : 
Respondent. Case No. 6 PRB/H.O. 88 
AUTHORITY: 
In compliance with Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, an 
administrative hearing at Step ' 5 was held with Paul S. Sucher, Grievant, 
Representing himself with the assistance of Ray Taylor of the Utah Public 
Employees Association, and the Utah State Department of Corrections 
represented by Michael Sanders, Management Auditor and Lynn Lund, Inspector 
General, on November 24, 25, 30 and December 4, 1987, at the Utah State 
Capitol. A court reporter made a verbatim record of the proceeaing and 
testimony and documentary evidence were received into evidence. Witnesses 
were placed under oath. The hearing examiner now makes ano enters the 
following: 
ISSUES: 
1. Was the Grievant, Paul S. Sucher, dismissed for just cause? 
2. If not, what is the appropriate remeay? 
FINDINGS OF FACT: 
1. Paul S. Sucher, Grievant (herinafter "Sucher11), has been employea 
by the Department of Corrections (hereinafter "Corrections") since 
October 28, 1976, and was working at the Utah State Prison's Young 
Adult Correctional Facility (hereinafter "YACF") at the time he was 
terminated on September 14, 1987. 
2. During his employment at the Prison, Sucher1s overall performance 
evaluation was above stanaard. 
3. Sucher was appointed to the rank of Lieutenant, a supervisory 
position, on January 1, 1984. 
4. Sucher received a Formal Warning letter, dated May 18, 1967, from 
Warden Jeffrey R. Galli, advising Sucher that his performance as a 
shift leaaer during an attempted escape on February 3, 1987, was 
unsatisfactory. This letter was not placed in Sucher's personnel 
file but was placed in his supervisor's file to be considered in 
connection with Sucher's next performance rating. 
5. On June 19, 1987, at approximately 3:50 p.m., inmate Greg Loya 
was confined to his housing unit in the YACF Starr 1 facility. Loya 
flooded his cell by plugging the toilet. Captain Tom Bona dispatched 
Officer Gerald White ana an inmate plumber to unclog Loya's toilet. 
6. Upon arriving at Loya's cell, Officer White opened the cell 
door. Loya walked out of his cell and exited the Starr 1 facility 
before the main entrance door was secured. Loya ignored Officer 
White's and Officer Jasper Blocker's verbal commands to return to his 
cell. 
7. As Loya exited Starr 1, Captain Bona rang the signal for all 
inmates to return to their housing units (i.e., "Ring In"). 
8. After exiting Starr 1, Loya approached the Central Control area 
(i.e., Building Six). As Loya arrived at Central Control, Captain 
John Powers approached him. Loya told Powers that he wished to be 
taken to A-Block. After or about this time, Captain Bona, Officer 
White, and Officer Blocker approached and realized the signal had 
been set off due to Loya's actions. Captain Power exited Central 
Control and went to the compound south of Central Control. 
9. At approximately the same time, Officers White and Blocker and 
Captain Bona arrived at Central Control. Sucher and Officer Dennis 
Moody also arrived to assist Captain Powers with Loya. 
10. A Captain ordered Sucher to place handcuffs on Loya. Sucher 
placed the handcuffs on Loya without much difficulty. Captain Bona 
then instructed Loya to return to his Starr 1 cell, at which time 
Loya became extremely agitated. 
11. As Officer Moody moved in to place a leg iron on Loya, Loya 
kicked at him. Officer Moody deflected the kick with his arm and 
applied a leg iron on one leg. Office Mooay received a cut on his 
nose due to Loya's kick. At this time, Officer Blocker took hold of 
Loya by placing an arm around his upper torso while Officer White 
applied a wrist lock, Captain Bona, Sucher and Officer Moody then 
secured the remaining leg iron. Sucher testified that he was also 
kicked by Loya during the struggle to put the leg irons on and 
received a cut on his wrist. 
12. After being restrained by handcuffs and leg irons, Loya still 
refused to return to Starr 1. Loya was then physically pickea up by 
Sucher (right Leg) and Officers Moody (left leg), White (right arm) 
and Blocker (left arm). Loya was carried "face up". 
13. After exiting the foyer area of Building Six and proceeding 
fifteen to twenty feet towards Starr 1, Loya moved to an upright 
sitting position and spat into Sucher's face. 
14. Immediately after being spit upon by Loya, Loya was observed to 
re-gather spit again by Officer Moody and Sucher. Sucher then 
punched at Loya and struck him in the mouth. As Sucher prepared to 
strike at Loya a second time, Officer White yelled for him to stop 
and Sucher withheld his second punch. Loya then spit in Sucherfs 
face a second time. Sucher released his hold on Loya and left the 
scene to wash his face. 
15. Loya's mouth was bleeding after he was struck by Sucher. 
16. Loya was turned face-down to prevent further spitting and was 
carried towards Starr 1. After being carried face-down for a 
distance, Loya was allowed to walk to his cell. 
17. Since the appointment on July 1, 1985, of Gary W. DeLand as 
Executive Director of the Department of Corrections, a Department of 
Corrections Manual of Policy and Procedures has been adoptea and the 
policy and procedural rules have been strictly enforced. 
18. Sucher was issued a copy of the Department of Corrections Manual 
of Policy and Procedures. 
19. Sucher holds the rank of Lieutenant, which is a supervisory 
position. Persons holding supervisory positions may be treated more 
harshly than non-supervisory personnel for the same misconduct. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW: 
1. As a merit covered employee, Sucher was entitled to all of the 
rights and privileges and protections afforded such employees. 
2. "Dismissals . . . . of career employees shall only be to advance 
the public interest and for such causes as inefficiency, incompetency, 
failure to maintain skills or adequate performance levels, 
insubordination, disloyalty to the orders of a superior, misfeasance, 
.-. :-b:a ' = , : e " Sectioi i 6 * -19-18(1), I I C.A. 1:953, 
as aiT;t:'-i • - -; i Management Rules, Divisioi of "' Person" inel 
Manageme-' * • * - - . • ^fifi e d . ) , 
* Personnel Managemet it Rules (1 Vbt eu, i LitI iirn nibl 11 d^di m t di no 
misfeasance as: 
Malfeasance: Intentional wrongdoi ng; deliberate 
violation ol J av ; i i ii si i iai lagement of 
responsibilities. 
Misfeasance: Performance ol a .3 ari ill! "i mjll act i c i i i i i c i i 
illegal or improper manner. 
i The Department of Corrections bears tl ie burden r r r '" """" 
appeal and must sustain the dismissal with substantial evidence. 
Discipline ol a inuiiL covered State employee must not be 
excessive, arbitrary or capricious. 
!„., "jiuchei violated the rules ano procedures set fti~' 
Department of Corrections Manual uf Poljcy and Procecui*. -
struck in the nioul, lib J full - restrained nri i.rm inmate wht % :* •• • . \»r -
while the Innate was be."inn carried h 11 in fflcer m c luic^ nc 
viol at en nir rmi rig si i are : 
J H 
Members will respect ana protect the civi 1 and J egai 
right s o* .  offender* 
AE 02/03.32 
A, Members sha 1 ] perforn i their duties in a manner 
which wi ] ] maintain appropriate standaros of eff it. m m 
and effectiveness in carrying out the funrt nn 
objectives of the Department. 
,,.3 actions of Sucher constituted malfeasance and/or misfeasance, 
h I he Department of " Corrections has si jstaineo its burdei i of proof 
Mi substantial eviaence that Sucher committed the improper acts 
complained of and Sucher's termination should be sustained if mitigating 
factors do not warrant a different disciplinary penalty. 
DECISION: 
The Grievant, Paul S. Sucher, was terminated from his employment for 
having struck inmate Greg Loya in the mouth while Loya was fully restrainea. 
At the hearing, the evidence was conflicting as to whether or not Sucher 
actually made contact with Loya's mouth when he struck at him. (See Joint 
Exhibit 1, Stipulation of Facts, paragraph 10.) 
Sucher contended that immediately after being spit upon by Loya, Loya 
was observed by him (Sucher) and Officer Dennis Mooay to re-gather spit 
again. Sucher, in an attempt to stop the second spit, swung at Loya but Loya 
kicked him in the chest causing him to miss Loya. Sucher testified that he 
felt no contact with Loya's mouth. Officer Moody, who was holding Loya's left 
leg, testified that he was watching Loya's mouth as he was re-gathering spit 
and that while it was possible that Sucher hit Loya he did not see it and was 
of the opinion that Sucher didn't make contact. Officer Moody also testified 
that he is 6'4" tall and when Loya kicked and was straightened out he couldn*t 
reach Loya's mouth. Sucher is 5'5" tall. Sucher also contended that Loya's 
mouth or lip could have been cut when the leg irons were being put on him or 
when he was placed face down. 
On the other hand, Officer Gerald White, who was holding Loya's right 
arm, testified he saw Sucher's fist strike Loya on the mouth and that he saw 
blood on Loya's mouth after he was hit. Captain Tom Bona testified his view 
was partially blocked so he couldn't see whether Sucher's fist made contact 
with Loya's mouth but he heard Loya curse Sucher for hitting him and then 
noticed blood on Loya's mouth. Officer Jasper Blocker, who had hold of Loya's 
left arm, testified he didn't see Sucher's fist make contact with Loya's mouth 
because of the position he was in but he first saw blood on Loya's mouth as he 
was being turned over. Captain John Power's Incident Report (Grievant's 
Exhibit 19) states, in part: "Sucher struck at Loya several times. I dio not 
see a direct contact because of staff being in the way. However, Loya started 
screaming at Sucher and statea he haci been h i t in the mouth and that he woulrt 
i even Ilr (Loya) was placet! on the ground and 'II tiiin!- him b^  his 
arm and escorted him ltd S tan il I then be turned his bead In tdll- 1;c ne 1 
noticed bloou coming onl of h.ic. inuuth and ht1 said i t wasn't right, fur an 
o f f i c e r l.n hiit an inmate in the mouth and he wanted to c a l l his lawyer." 
Of f i cer Michael Daras t e s t i f i e d that he d idn ' t see Sucher s t r i ke LO\J but 
f i r s t saw blood i n Luya's mouth when Loya was turned face-down. 
l i i t bli"-LK.* -... , .. ..-: ,- jccurre i * -: ,. • ; *a.- c . : ruggl inc, K i o i n c , 
curs: g^ and being highlv f-revocativt.; .ncerstandable that versions cb. 
;.,. wr-r. too*- -"julc v.;-.- • ^owever, the eviaence is reasonar:-i^ ' j iea: u
 at 
seer :- •-• •
 : _ : i u * ... \ : mc ion : : • * ! , - : * ' - necui vocal ly state^ mat 
he s c * _ui r?c f i s t rra^r ./ont^r • .JOG was se- ••a'- i . v /^mediately 
a f t e : tne „,.;,* *a-r strum- arc LC>C spontaneou:-.. \ >--..>-.: " .-,. :-^ - - r ' , t 
hin~. r \: * ne-'-f r ^3 C A r r - ; - - '••• :"> t * r-*~- -••< - • * •• * T ~ ' ~ - , a 
o n t h e m o u t h 
uncomrnL • .•-..* . . -; 5 to be 
subjectec .. abuse ! ., r , :LCJ.^; dOubr,;. -=i . physically 
attacke -- ' * uncom^' o:it;:r lor.r*., **,,"• • ~e ohysical 
force, >JL •. - riKinu inmate, wrier ' ' <- ituaticr, requires luya's 
spitt.ir , .rhe-r'F fa.*- *a5 c 'e-ciTini - • • ; r ' rr ^ocsti, o I rin 
question is, *• * FT" ether Suchei - ^auar-ec ,r ^riK^nc Lcy^ 
The evidence is clear that Loya we- ^O1.^ resticinec ot :. .nr>p 
Sucher struck him, Loya had leg * 1 . *s -.ancL^ feG btr".T ".. D« 
was being carried by four officers. Loya was struggling arc K I L H - L ' 
evidence does not she * Hud he posec « serious thre-* :: . r~»er .- - T ire; 
officers. Sucher contended, howeve: • actec ; sei? jefensr ^ - -- > 
struck at Loya to prevent being ,, . * *- Ju *.* : ' ont :.»•!:: x; 
AIDS (Acquired Immune Deficiency byna'n-e *: **ie si . c center: ; ; 
to AIDS will be discussed below but suffice ! - n* • * he eviaerx- A K > 
n g j . S Upp 0 rt his contention that this was a justifiacie act _l beif jtfer--
Loya's act of spitting in Sucherfs face was highly provocative and 
was one to which many if not most persons would react by striking at the 
spitter. Sucher, however, should not have reacted in this manner. He had 
approximately ten years of experience as a peace officer at the Prison and at 
the time of the incident he held the rank of lieutenant, a supervisory 
position. He knew, or should have known, that, next to the use of deadly 
force, striking an inmate should be employed only when necessary to control 
the inmate or to protect himself. 
Sucher1 s actions not only did not conform with the standard of 
conduct required of a correctional officer but they riskea the possibility of 
seriously injuring an inmate (only Loya's lip was cut) and they exposed the 
Department of Corrections to possible legal liability. His actions violated 
the following rules set forth in the Department of Corrections Manual of 
Policy and Procedures and constituted malfeasance and/or misfeasance as 
definea in the Personnel Management Rules, 1986 edition: 
AE 02/03.01 Standard of Conduct 
A. Members will respect and protect the legal rights of all 
offenders. 
AE 02/03.32 
A. Members shall maintain sufficient competency to properly 
perform their duties and assume the responsibilities of 
their position. Members shall perform their duties in a 
manner which will maintain appropriate standards of 
efficiency and effectiveness in carrying out the 
functions and objectives of the Department. 
From the foregoing, it is the conclusion of the Examiner that the 
Department of Corrections proved by substantial evidence that Sucher committed 
the acts complained of and that disciplinary action was warranted. However, 
the appropriateness of the disciplinary action taken must be examined in the 
light of whatever mitigating circumstances may be present. 
In considering the appropriateness of disciplinary action involving a 
peace officer with supervisory responsibilities, the following quotation from 
- 4T £• • , 
.-r iiiompson v. -.cu. ^ricuu -i-,^. . .M
 t - .^. -...inistr&i* .i. Law 
Tooy Jacquez inciuaec "r ^ s Propose ^ • <••»* • ' hearing s"-rore 
In weighing . i employee 
misconduct cases], *-f t/supervisory 
function is most siurificar • previous cases . 
. . (citations omitted) . . . references have been 
made regarding employee accountability. It must 
be restated here that those employees carrying 
Peace Officer status are more accountable for 
their conduct than non-Peace Officer status 
employees or civiliar is. Ii \ Peace Officer 
positions, persons seeking higher rank or 
supervisory responsibility may be more harshly 
treated for the same conduct in non-supervisory 
personnel '-'ipervisory rank demands this standard. 
1 he f ol 1 owii ig are mitigating circumstances coi isict:. : 
"**• ' f"1" cevera! witnesses testa* .e-\ c/ • <, !rc; .ir 
'zcer^ a>-i. ' - '' • ".* •" "^f Aan.ira^LraLun hac - il 
- , .oyees the> WGL,., .  • release di"-.: t^-* -ucrei's name was . -ie 
list, ' «• • <:,-• "aa seer; sucr ;:- .is.? a> . .' i clear * : v * • vijence 
\ ** t- ". - • -pposea ;,::: existec, sithougr > witness sale f »r '.t.~ if 
the " . »jt w a s - " ^ :e :J ' *ds before . -*te: :ucne; *as 
« * the ran , ieLtenar it Il Il ie " f ij t • - vidence was based solely 
• J: .= d •». v *«*led to much credit ill v. in tf ie absence of mc re 
aefinite pxoo; inai 5^r. « **st existed. 
Lack of Training - Sucher contended that, he was not trained in I IOW tc 
handle a situation such as the one in which Loya kicked and spit ui i I lii n i Ii i 
I^Hfc, a class 01 seminar was given on Abuse of force and a lengthy outlif ie of 
the instruction piesH'itetl was given those attending the class, Sucher signed 
the roster fur thosr attending the class I ml he testified: I. c r,cr 
receive the instiuetion vt [\«* ni,r|i«p ^" nlhc] witnesses w^c sioner * 
the class a J so test i f i PI ! III" i «i I I III! Il 11 ii" ,.t • • JI i u i u it 
out Linn 
INeyaiUleb";. nil wlietlit i oi mil '.AJI lit i received j p e c i l n t r a i l unci n huw 
tn hjnuJt t h i s part jr nlLi? s i t ua t i on , hi IIMI1 mi I nrt i f n i l peace I I M I I P I HUM 
received training each year in order to maintain his certification. As such, 
and through his years of experience as a peace officer he knew, or should have 
known, that on occasions he would be subject to verbal abuse, be spit on, and 
perhaps physically attacked, and that striking an inmate in order to control a 
situation or protect himself was only a means of last resort, next to the use 
of deadly force. 
The Examiner believes that this contention is not entitled to much 
weight as a mitigating circumstance. 
Fear of Aids - Sucher contended that he struck at Loya to prevent 
being spit upon a second time because of his fear of contracting AIDS from the 
spit. 
Prior to the Loya incident, there was no training, as such, given to 
the Prison staff on the subject of AIDS. There was, however, an Office 
Memorandum, dated November 5, 1985, issued to Prison inmates concerning AIDS 
(Management's Exhibit 25) and one witness said that this was also issued to 
the Prison staff. Subsequent to the Loya incident, Prison personnel have been 
issuea rubber gloves to be worn when they shake-aown a prison cell. No 
evidence was presented as to the reason for now issuing rubber gloves on a 
shake-down but it does indicate a concern over the matter of AIDS- It shoula 
also be noted that prior to the Loya incident a number of the Prison employees 
signed a petition requesting that all inmates known to have engaged in 
homosexual practices or been a user of intravenous arugs be tested for AIDS. 
With respect to the Office Memorandum on AIDS, it states, in part, 
that there is no evidence that AIDS is spread by "sneezing, coughing or 
spitting." It also says that the risk of getting AIDS can be reducea by 
"avoiding the sharing of cigarettes, razors, and manicure sets." Sucher 
testified that he found a pamphlet on the Prison grounds concerning AIDS and 
he recalled that it said you shouldn't share cigarettes, razors, or 
toothbrushes in order to avoid getting AIDS. Although Sucher wasn't sure the 
Office Memorandum of November 5, 1985 was the same pamphlet he saw, it appears 
to have been the same one. 
No evidence was presented that Loya had AIDS or that he was an 
intravenous drug user or 11 ml lit engaged .1 IIUI ubtn ..i.l en I 1 il.it.-i- w l m h are 
the primary means of acquiring AIDS. 
Sucher testified that he believed /WUb could be t r a n s m i t s - '/ ~jugh 
saliva; that since the Loya .Incident he has taken a test for AIDS t'' nft 
yet have the results of the test; and that his and his wife's fear 1 .. has 
disrupted theii maritaJ lelationship. 
;H *- ' ~ ~7 v p t t - .* genuinr -^ J-Ur Evaminer. Yet, his 
fear w-* evidently r.> ** rjectivt" m a n o o j e c t . ^ -vidence was produced 
tn the r'*f: : : .-• - rDS can be tj an>',tter M , :. ^ sa-:va ex spit 01 that AIDS 
Is sue . . .-- . * *•:*$*- r.-* Suche: - ' prison personneJ were 
inadequately trained with respect to it. 
Union Activities and Grievances - .,..1. .. - =:r*u: • -
al, the FJrison. In connection * n n is union activities nt '..r/. numoei 
grievances with tht Prison ^r*r .• . strati? • juche: contenaec 'J a' *<:•;. 
activities caused Warden GaJJi iu uirecioi ui institutions, David Franchina, 
11 1 become prejudiceo aga i r •  \ if 1 m , 
Theie was U.'stiniony tiom witnesses that they had heaid there was "bad 
bioon.1l " between Warden Gall 1 and Sucher, The evidence also showeu t! iat, 
Sucher1!;* grievances caused Warden Galli and Director Franchina to speno 
siderable time in handling them This testimony and evidence does not 
establish that Warden dalii and Direcior franchina were- prejudiced against 
!
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 F" recommended hi s t e rmi nat i on 1 n t\ n f 
jucice. 
If ir nnter) 11 id! i 11 I M I ul 1 vi II11 j ei to 1 Debdi I I 11 Il 1111111 1 
(Management's Eiiuiui 6} he made int. following statenient in paragraph t: 
Both Division Di rector David Franchina and 
Warden Jeff Galli were contacted to see if they 
had second thoughts on the possibility of 
terminating Sucher. Both were vei y sirongly 
opposed to Lt. Sucher's continued employment. 
Both felt he has exhibited a failure to adequately 
support and enforce Department/Division policies, 
has 1 antagonistic Division 
administration's efforts and has been a catalyst 
to contention rather than exercising his 
supervision/management responsibilities in a 
responsible manner. 
This statement seems to indicate that Warden Galli and Director 
Franchina, when asked if they had second thoughts about Sucher's termination, 
considered factors other than those arising directly out of the Loya 
incident. Both Warden Galli and Director Franchina testified at the hearing. 
Neither were cross-examined as to this statement. Warden Galli testified that 
he recommended termination because Loya was fully restrained and there was no 
justification in Sucher's striking him. Director Franchina testified he 
recommended termination because of the real and potential harm and liability 
to which Sucher's actions exposed the Prison, and because Sucher's rank of 
Lieutenant required him to exercise leadership responsibilities and be a model 
for others. 
In a letter to Sucher (Management's Exhibit 16) advising Sucher that 
he was recommending termination, Director Franchina said: 
I have thoroughly reviewed the Proposed Action 
prepared by Administrative Law Judge Toby 
Jacquez. Based on the decision and options and 
penalties discussea in the aecision, it is my 
recommendation to Executive Director Gary W. 
DeLand that you be terminated from your employment 
with the Department of Corrections. His decision 
is based on the facts in the case, the position 
you held at the time of the incident, and the real 
and potential harm and liability to the Department 
that may result from your action. 
In view of the testimony of Warden Galli and Director Franchina at 
the hearing and the statements made by Director Franchina in the above quoted 
letter, it is the conclusion of the Hearing Examiner that their recommendation 
for termination was based on the facts involved in the Loya incident and not 
on other factors. 
Even-Handed Treatment - Testimony was given concerning several 
instances during the period 1979 to 1982 in which correctional officers struck 
or otherwise mishanaled inmates and were not terminated for their actions but 
were given disciplinary penalties considerably less seve^p reuciveu 
»> *-' .ertinent tre^e Instances would probaL^j b^ppwi: Sucher's 
contention tna* i , eceive t v-landed ti e<'• "•* : ^rwever, :nr? *-f 
*^.. .ntme^t • eLana as Executive Directoi - Departrre: 
i:?-1 ^ . v. _
 :£ .: procedures has c-ceii aocptea ar id copies 
is;^t~ • '' ? n e c u c n e . *fficeis arc •  jie-s ant regulations have been 
more strict
 ) 'eason, • \t Hear:og Examiner is of the 
at :nio' *hat i"e rrorer *c t. -valuate even-handed treatment cases is to 
-.> ; ...w^ ,u A .._*_ „currec eurinc tl le more current administration of 
the Prison. 
-• following are the more recent cases presented by the parties: 
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4^- f, The Hearing Examiner assumes the ' 
testimony describing II if- tIrcumstancet ^jriuunoinL trrt even 
disciplinary action taken against Wilkinson :s \i incomplete *%v 
Examiner is unable to faiily vvi.i 
Berendson case (1984-1985): Officer Ron Berendson struck a partially 
restrained inmate to the floor. The inmate sued and the Uniteo States 
District Court dismissed the case. In his Report and Recommendation to the 
court, the United States Magistrate said (Managements Exhibit 19): 
The facts of this case show that defendants did not use force 
until after plaintiff used provoking language, employed force against 
Officer Berendson, and refusea to comply with lawful requests. There 
is no showing of wanton or excessive use of force. . . . 
Sucher alleged that this incident went to a fact finding hearing and 
no disciplinary action was taken. The evidence does not disclose whether the 
fact finding hearing took place before, during, or after the court trial. The 
Hearing Examiner can only conjecture that disciplinary action may not have 
been taken in view of the Magistrate's finding set forth above. 
Berendson case (1986): Berendson was sent by Sucher, who was shift 
leader on duty, to shake-down a cell. The inmate's behavior was disruptive 
and Berenason put an arm lock on him and pushed him into the cell. During the 
fracas, Berendson knocked the inmate down, although Sucher saio that he 
thought the inmate fell rather than being knocked aown. No disciplinary 
action was taken on this incident. 
Corrections submitted Management's Exhibit 20, which purports to be 
an investigative report on the incident by Investigator Russ Boyce. Boyce 
concluded that the inmate made physical threats which provoked the incident 
and that Officer Berendson did what was necessary to control him. 
Sucher claimed that Management's Exhibit 20 does not refer to the 
same incident. The Hearing Examiner is not positive but they appear to refer 
to the same incident since both involve a problem in getting an inmate back 
into his cell. 
Berendson case (1987): Sucher testified that Officer Ron Berendson 
knocked down an inmate in the culinary. The inmate had threateneo Berendson 
earlier and when Berendson came into the culinary the inmate raised his arm 
like he was going to hit Berendson. No disciplinary action was taken. 
wj^ K-:--1- *--r*u-f:~ *-*~™,~+f«« o^ -*-o
 whw nn Oxscip^nary action was 
tal-« si in, ' - -*--c-: .•*.: ;>-I-M -ei cannot M o p e r i y evaluate I: a s inciaent. 
Rodriguez case (1985): Sucher cited the Rodriguez incident as 
supporting his position I h.il he hid no I receive even-handed treatment. 
Mfficer Jerry Rodriguez got into a dispute with another officer on the Prison 
yiuunds and a fight ensued,, 
Management fs Exhibit 11 shows that during a terminal:ior i hearing or i 
this incident Rodriguez voluntarily agreed to submit a letter of resignation. 
FalfTia case (1985): Sucher cited this incident as supporting his 
p n s i * II II "„ 
Management'"o Exhibit 12 shows thai during a termination hearing for 
certain acts of alleged malfeasance which, are set forth in the Exhibit, 
Galvasino Palma stipuiatei""! 1 hrif I ie m 111 ri resign f m m Ivic. rmp 1 riymer il wi I hi the 
Department i if fnrrecf Ionir 
Tiut iillo case (15?& , -.; ^ r •«-. i - -~^  
Final Order in a disciplinarv n e a i ^ ~ :i w*iK -  ^ Tur aiL., 
the Administrative Law * **.. z - ati^i, pe:teir,< 'c:?er; 
whichi an Inmate threw a i i.~ ' :^> *' ;j f s* , > rx' ^ > *'> a ; - . 
The inmate also threw a n,„t * carbonatec zi*u\r * ; . * nj:: i-nt 
at Trujiiio. Officer liii csponae- h: *.
 r : nt remaining . r-> 
two, two-quart pitchers c .nrn't. oi * tarn;- -• ** ;r. -
other coff Ilii, content, -ot strike • •* nmatt Gtrj^e: Tr ,*,. * 
demanded that the inmate's , et* ^e opener * : u apneas were iefjs- ^  
Officer Trujiiio hail previous! '< • 'sciplinec — ~~e occasion and 
on another f lad been suspended fY. ' v "":*;: m not t iola a 
supervisory position. For his actions . . M .Gent. eceived a tl tirty 
day suspension i without pay and was requires * ontac* r-.; * .  i. w-througf i with 
Associated Behavior Consultants. 
] • this case, Trujiiio1 s disc-r 1li ? was not as harsh as It 
fiiiqhl nowever, it does i iot si »ow « ^^. if leant disparity 
treatment with that given Sucher in that Trujillo did not occupy a supervisory 
position, the inmate was not restrained, and the incident involved a 
dissimilar factual situation. 
After consioering the foregoing incidents, it is the conclusion of 
the Hearing Examiner that they do not demonstrate any significant disparity 
since 1984 in Disciplinary treatment afforded others as compared with that 
given Sucher. There were two or three incidents cited by Sucher that could 
not be properly evaluated because of insufficient information. 
Sucher's Record: Sucher1s employment record shows that he receivea 
standard or above ratings in his performance evaluations. He did receive a 
"warning" letter, which was not placed in his personnel file, as a result of 
the manner in which he hanaled an attempted escape. 
Sucher tried to get the administration to develop a training program 
in self defense, which Demonstrates his interest in improving training at the 
Prison. 
Several witnesses testified that Sucher was professional and 
cooperative in the way he handled his duties. 
CONCLUSION: 
The Hearing Examiner has carefully considered the mitigating 
circumstances discussed above and concludes that they present no sound basis 
on which he could properly modify the decision of the Department of 
Corrections to terminate Lieutenant Sucher. It is therefore the decision of 
the Hearing Examiner that the Department of Corrections has proved by 
substantial evidence that Lieutenant Sucher committed the acts complained of; 
that Lieutenant Sucher1s conduct constituted malfeasance and/or misfeasance; 
that under the circumstances his termination did not constitute excessive, 
arbitrary or capricious discipline; and that Lieutenant Sucher was dismissed 
for just cause. 
ORDER; 
The Department of Correction's terminaf.io'" * Lieutenant Sucher is 
sustained. 
D A T E D this tf "~ day of JANUARY, 
K WRIGHT W < E R 
hearing Officer 
Personnel Review i i 
Enc.: Mailing Certificate 
Any appeal of this 'decision to Step 6 by either party must be 
received in wi itiny witl iii i i 0 working aays ai the Persof ne\l Review Board 
Office upon receipt of this decision. 
M A I L I N G C E R T I F I C A T E 
I certify that a true and exact copy of the foregoing FINDINGS OF 
FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, DECISION AND ORDER at Step 5 has been sent to the 
following: Paul S. Sucher, the Grievant, at 481 East 2825 North, Provo, Utah 
84604; Ted Cooley and Ray Taylor, Employee Relations Representatives with the 
Utah Public Employees1 Association; Gary W. DeLand, Executive Director; Lynn 
J. Lund, Inspector General; Michael Sanders, Management Auditor, all with the 
Department of Corrections, at 6100 South 300 East, Salt Lake City, Utah 
84107; David R. Franchina, Institutions Operations Director, and Jeff Galli, 
Warden, Young Aault Correctional Facility, both at Utah State Prison, Draper, 
Utah 84020. 
D A T E D this /cX day of JANUARY, 1988. 
DONA HILLMAN, Secretary 
Utah Personnel Review Board 
Any appeal of this decision to Step 6 by either party must be 
received in writing within 10 working days at the Personnel Review Board 
Office upon receipt of this decision. 
PERSONNEL REVIEW BOARD DECISION 
PAl , StJCHER v. UTAH STATE PRISON 
o PRB 27 (1988) 
BEFORE THE PERSONNEL REVIEW BOARD OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
In the Matter Of: : 
D E C I S I O N 
PAUL, S. SUCHER : 
Grievant and Appel lant, A N D 
v. O R D E R 
• 
UTAH STATE PRISOf 1, 
Agency and Respond* ' : Case No. 6 PRB/H.O. 88 (Step 5) 
Case No, 3 PRB 2? (Step 6) 
"1 he .Personnel Review Board cor ivened on Decei nt ei ill 3, 1988, pursuant tc 
no t ice , for an appel late leve l review of til ie above-captioned matter 1 1 ie 
fo l lowing Boai c:l member s were present ai id const i tu ted a quoi un i: Chai rrnan 
Bruce 1 , Jones, 3eai i IMI bishop, David M. H i l b i g , il latlll lul ee i i Hirabayashi, and 
Jose L. T r u j l l l o . Board member Hirabayashi recused hersel f from vot ing on the 
decis ion, 
Paul S. Sucher ("Appel lant" and "Sucher") was represented by I Zane. d i l l , 
Attorney at L aw, wit l Adamson, Clark 4 GUI,,, i I  nl Hit- IlLah Public 
Employeesl Associatior i. "I t ie Utal i State Pusui i J *iis i, epresentea tiv 
Lyi ii i J . Lui id, Inspectoi General, wi th the Department u. i jorrectior is. 
A c e r t i f i e d court reportei mull «i i nihil iiiiiii iiptuic! nt the appellate 
proceeding before the BodnJ, Ihe o f f i c i a l return! nl tht evident iary/Step b 
proceedings had previously been transcribed ano made avai lable to the par t ies 1 
representatives for the purpose nl Mihmilt.u IJI t h i n leyidl I J I H I I , uim m in 
support of presenting t h e n oral aiyuments id un appellate/Step 6 pruceeaing 
oII till ie State 's Grievance Procedure. 11it just -mentioned t ranscr ip t of t he 
evident iary proceedings i:,. contained in low vuiumes, as fo l lows: Volur,.-
the record for November P i^, J987; Vnilume I I Is of November 25; Volume :.. 
of Nnvemf:ieT If! arid Vc J; i ime I' i i ' 11f Ducem!m• i i (ill"" i t ec:J hereinaf* * 
1
 Ill Ill || II , ) 
The Board's statutory authority is found under provision of the State 
Personnel Management Act, at Utah Code Annotated (1988 Supp.), Sections 67-19-
et seq., especially Sections 67-19-20 through 67-19-25, which set forth the 
Boardfs responsibilities and appellate jurisdiction. The Board's current 
regulatory provisions have been promulgated as the Grievance Procedure Rules 
(1987 edition). This case has proceeded properly and timely to the Boara at 
the appellate/Step 6 level of the State's Grievance Procedure. The Board has 
assumed jurisdiction over the Appellant's appeal ana this proceeding 
constitutes the final step in the administrative review of appeals brought on 
by employees under the State's codified Grievance Procedure. 
Appellant's counsel included a Motion To Consider New Evidence which he 
incorporated into his brief for the Step 6 appeal hearing. In response, the 
Agency filed a countermotion to deny the Board from considering new evidence 
at either the Step 5 or Step 6 levels. On November 30, 1988 the Boara offered 
an opportunity for the parties' counsel to argue orally in support of their 
respective motions. In a Ruling On The Motion To Consiaer New Evidence, 
issued December 7, 1988, the Board denied Appellant's motion to take new or 
additional evidence. 
Pursuant to proper notice, oral argument on the substantive issues of the 
appeal occurred on December 13, 1988, following which the recora was closea at 
Step 6. The Board then took the case under advisement ana immediately 
deliberated in an executive session. Being fully apprised of the facts, 
premises and issues, together with consideration of both the written briefs 
and oral arguments, the Board now makes and enters its findings, conclusions 
and decision which are based upon the entire record of the eviaentiary/Step 5 
proceedings. 
I. 
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
In a letter dated July 6, 1987, Lieutenant Paul S. Sucher was notified ana 
invited to attend a hearing in his behalf scheduled for July 22, 1987. The 
purpose of the July 22 administrative hniTinrj wa* to determine ^t"3l]v 
whether disciplinary penalties were warranted against Suchei, and " 
should be the nature of those disciplinary sanct ions. 
Specifically, Suchei was informed through ^ r * .st-mentionea J etter that 
he: . • 
, [A]nd a number of other s' "" Involved in a 
confrontation with inmate Greg Loya, which, after 
attempts had been made to convince Mr ^oya to return to 
his cell, you and other staff were forced to place him in 
handcuffs with his hands behind his back. When Mr. Loya 
continued to struggle and to kick he was then placea in leg 
shackles. He was then carried from the Sallyport at the 
YACF to Unit II. During this process of carrying him, 
Mr. Loya allegedly spit on you. At that point, it is 
alleged that you struck Mr. Loya * itl your fist ano were 
preparing to hit him again when another staff member 
intervened. You then left the scene and Mr I oya was 
conducted to his cell. (Mgt. Exh. 3.) 
As a resuJ t, nt his alleged .involvement i i tl te just-described incident, 
Suche J I v ioiated tl le 1 ollowing Depar tmei it o 1 " 
Corrections -ilicies an;: Procedure?-
Ac u; conduct. i"uu fai led 1.11 respect 
the legal right of Mr. Li \ The act of 
striking him while he w..as lul J >/ restrained 
violated this rule. 
hi OL UJ'.3i I Unsatisfactory Performance. Your action i f 
striking an inmate in restraints was a 
demonstratioi i of unsatisfactory performance 
for an officer i r i your position as a staff 
supervisor 
AE 02, 03.35 Endangering Conduct by Prison staff. Your 
act of striking an inmate threatened the 
safety, security and control of the 
institutior i, 
AE 02/03.37 Unlawful Conduct. i oui striking air i inmate 
who was fully restrained with handcuffs and 
leg shackles constitutes aii assault, as 
defined by Utah law, and is an unlawful 
action in violation of tl ids sec 
(Mgt. Exh. 3.) 
Therein, Sucher was warned that if management could prove that he ha a 
struck a fully restrained inmate, even one who had spit upon him, Sucher would 
be subject to serious disciplinary penalties. 
Subsequently, the administrative factfinding hearing took place on July 22 
and 27, 1987. The Corrections' administrative law judge, in his Findings of 
Fact No. 11, made a specific factual finding that: 
11. Immediately after being spit upon by Inmate Loya, 
Lieutenant Sucher reacted by punching at ana striking 
Inmate Loya in the mouth area. As Lieutenant Sucher 
prepared to strike Inmate Loya a second time, the 
officers with Lieutenant Sucher yelled for him (i.e., 
Sucher) to stop. Lieutenant Sucher then releasee his 
hold on Inmate Loya and left the scene to wash his 
face. As the result of Lieutenant Sucher's blow, 
Inmate Loya was bleeding from the mouth. 
(Mgt. Exh. 2, Part II, p. 3.) 
As a result of finaing aggravating circumstances present, the Department 
of Corrections' aoministrative law judge recommended disciplinary penalties in 
his August 17, 1987 Proposed Action, as follows: 
This case is aggravated by the fact that a blow was 
actually landed by Lieutenant Sucher on a fully restrained 
offender, and also by the fact Lieutenant Sucher is in a 
supervisory capacity. In this case adequate cause, as 
required by Division of Personnel Management Rule 
ll.b.(2)(d), is found to allow the termination of 
Lieutenant Sucher. At a minimum, this examiner recommends 
that he be demoted to a non-supervisory rank as allowed by 
Division of Personnel Management Rule 11.1.(4)(c)(1), ana 
that he be suspended without pay for thirty calendar days. 
As per Division of Personnel Management Rule 10.b.(2), this 
examiner would also suggest that he be referred for 
personal counseling with Associated Behavior Consultants 
and that he be transferred to a duty station that limits 
interaction with offenders. (Ibid, p. 6.) 
* The fourth charge against Sucher, that of unlawful conduct through a 
violation of Corrections' policy AE 02/03.37, was dismissed at the 
departmental hearing on July 22, 1987. (T. II, pp. 18-19) 
After issuance of the foregoing Proposed Action, Director of Institutional 
Operations at the Utah State Prison, David R. Franchina, recommended to the 
Department of Corrections' Executive Director Gary W. DeLand that Sucher's 
employment with the Utah State Prison be terminated. According to Franchina, 
his recommendation was based, at least in part, on the adduced factual 
findings set forth in the Proposed Action, the level of supervisory 
responsibility held by Sucher at the time of the June 19 inciaent, as well as 
the potential for harm and civil liability implicit in the act of striking a 
fully restrained inmate. (Mgt. Exh. 16.) 
Prior to issuing his Final Order in the Sucher incident, Corrections' 
Director DeLand offered to meet personally with Sucher and the latterfs 
professional employee relations representative, Ray Taylor. That meeting 
occurred on September 1, 1987. Later, on September 9, Mr. Sucher's 
representative was invited by DeLand to preview the Final Order prior to its 
dissemination. Under date of September 14, DeLand issued his Final Oraer, 
which dismissed Sucher from employment with the Department of Corrections. 
Upon timely appeal pursuant to the Grievance Procedure, an 
evidentiary/Step 5 hearing was conducted under jurisdiction of a Personnel 
Review Board hearing officer. In preparation for the evidentiary/Step 5 
proceeding, a Stipulation Of Facts ("Stipulation") was produced jointly by the 
parties. (See Jt. Exh. 1.) During most of the Step 5 proceedings, Lt. Sucher 
acted in a pro se capacity and represented himself and presented his case in 
chief. However, upon offering his testimony, Sucher's employee relations 
representative asked him questions, which Sucher then answered. After 
concluding the evidentiary/Step 5 proceedings, the parties submitted 
posthearing summations and closing arguments to the hearing officer; the 
record at the evidentiary level was then closed. 
The Board's trier of facts made a specific finding that: 
14. Immediately after being spit upon by Loya, Loya was 
observed to re-gather spit again by Officer Moody and 
Sucher. Sucher then punched at Loya and struck him in the 
mouth. As Sucher prepared to strike at Loya a second time, 
Officer White yelled for him to stop and Sucher withhelo 
his second punch. Loya then spit in Sucher1 s face a second 
time. Sucher released his hold on Loya and left the scene 
to wash his face. (Step 5 Decision, p. A.) 
The hearing officer then made conclusions of law, among them that: 
6. Sucher violated the rules and procedures set forth in 
the Department of Corrections Manual of Policy and 
Procedure [sic] in that he struck in the mouth a fully 
restrained prison inmate who spit in his face while the 
inmate was being carried by four officers. The rules he 
violated in doing so are: 
AE 02/03.01 
A. Members will respect and protect the civil 
and legal rights of all offenders. 
AE 02/03.32 
A [sic] Members shall perform their 
duties in a manner which will maintain 
appropriate standards of efficiency and 
effectiveness in carrying out the functions 
and objectives of the Department. 
• • * 
7. The actions of Sucher constituted malfeasance and/or 
misfeasance. 
8. The Department of Corrections has sustainea its burden 
of proof by substantial evidence that Sucher committed the 
improper acts complained of and [that] Sucher's termination 
should be sustained if mitigating factors do not warrant a 
different disciplinary penalty. (Ibia., pp. 5-6.) 
After concluding that Sucher had, indeed, struck inmate Loya while the 
latter was being restrained by handcuffs and leg shackles, the Step 5 trier of 
facts further concluded that: 
. . . [I]t is the conclusion of the [Board's hearing 
officer] that the Department of Corrections proved by 
substantial evidence that Sucher committed the acts 
complained of and that disciplinary action was warranted. 
However, the appropriateness of the disciplinary action 
taken must be examined in the light of whatever mitigating 
circumstances may be present. (Ibid., p. 8.) 
The Step 5 hearing officer next considered six separate mitigating 
circumstances on behalf of Sucher: 
1. Hit List 
2. Lack of Training 
3. Fear of AIDS 
4. Union Activities and Grievances 
5. Evenhanded Treatment 
6. Sucher1s [Employment] Record 
Having considered the just-listed six mitigating factors, the board's 
hearing officer essayed "that they present no sound basis on which he could 
properly modify the decision of [the Utah State Prison and] the Department of 
Corrections to terminate Lieutenant Sucher." (Ibid., p. 16.) 
It is therefore the decision of the [Board's hearing 
officer] that the Department of Corrections has provea by 
substantial evidence that Lieutenant Sucher committed the 
acts complained of; that Lieutenant Sucher1s conduct 
constituted malfeasance an/or misfeasance; that under the 
circumstances his termination did not constitute excessive, 
arbitrary or capricious discipline; and that Lieutenant 
Sucher was dismissed for just cause. (Ibid, p. 16.) 
The Step 5 Decision, portions of which are quoted above, was issued on 
January 12, 1988. Subsequently, the matter came on appeal to Step 6 at the 
appellate level of the Grievance Procedure. 
II. 
FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
The event giving rise to Sucher's appeal from termination with the Utah 
State Prison occurred on June 19, 1987. At approximately 3:50 p.m., Young 
Adult Correction Facility ("YACF") inmate Greg Loya flooded his cell in the 
Star I facility by plugging his toilet. Captain Tom Bona dispatched 
Correctional Officer Gerald White together with an inmate plumber to unclog 
Loya's toilet. Upon arriving at Loya's cell, Officer White openea the cell 
door. Then, as soon as the cell door was opened, Loya immediately exited his 
cell and departed from the Star I facility, even before the main entrance door 
was secured. Officers White and Jasper Blocker verbally comrnandea Loya to 
return to his cell. Loya, however, ignored these commands and continued on 
his way. 
After Loya exited from the Star I facility, Captain Tom Bona sounoea the 
"ring-in," which is a signal for all inmates to promptly return to their 
respective housing units. The ring-in signal alerts the correctional staff 
that a serious inmate problem is at hand and sets in motion a "lock-down" of 
inmates. 
Having departed the Star I facility, inmate Loya approached the Central 
Control area (i.e., Building Six) of the YACF. As Loya arrived at Central 
Control, Captain John Powers approached him. Captain Powers and inmate Loya 
were standing in the foyer area, a position immediately north of the enclosea 
Central Control area of Building Six. Loya then told Captain Powers that he 
wished to be taken to A-Block. At this time Captain Powers heard the ring-in 
signal, and with the approach of Captain Bona and Officers White ano blocker, 
Powers realized that the signal haa been set off due to inmate Loya's leaving 
his cell. 
At approximately the same time that Officers White, Blocker and 
Captain Bona arrived at Central Control, Lieutenant Sucher and Officer 
Dennis Moody also arrived to assist Captain Powers, Captain Bona, and 
Officers White and Blocker with inmate Loya. 
Captain Bona ordered Sucher to place handcuffs on Loya, which Sucher 
proceeded to do. Captain Bona then instructed Loya to return to his cell in 
Star I, at which time inmate Loya became highly agitated. 
As Officer Moody moved in to place a leg iron on one of inmate Loya's 
legs, the latter kicked at Moody. Officer Moody deflected the kick with his 
arm (receiving a cut on his nose from the kick) and secured a leg iron on one 
of Loya's legs. Officer Blocker then took hold of Loya's upper torso by 
placing an arm around him while Officer White applied a wrist lock on Loya. 
Captain Bona, Lieutenant Sucher, and Officer Moody secured the remaining leg 
iron. Sucher testified that he received a kick by Loya during this struggle 
to put leg irons on Loya, receiving a cut on his wrist. 
After the correctional officers had restrained Loya with handcuffs 
fastened behind his back and had shackled his lower legs with leg irons, 
inmate Loya still refused to return to his Star I cell. Due to his refusal to 
even walk, Loya was then picked up bodily by the following YACF staff: Sucher 
(right leg), Moody (left leg), Blocker (left arm), ana White (right arm). 
Loya was carried out of the foyer of Building Six in a faceup position toward 
Star I. Upon being carried about twenty feet from the Building Six foyer, 
Loya shifted into an upright or sitting position from which he then spat in 
Lieutenant Sucherfs face. 
The critical factual finding made by the Board's trier of facts is 
Number 14, which states: 
Immediately after being spit upon by Loya, Loya was 
observed to re-gather spit again by Officer Moody and 
Sucher. Sucher then punched at Loya and struck him in the 
mouth. As Sucher prepared to strike at Loya a secona time, 
Officer White yelled for him to stop and Sucher withheld 
his second punch. Loya then spit in Sucher's face a second 
time. Sucher released his hold on Loya and left the scene 
to wash his face. (Step 5 Decision, p. 4.) 
Blocker, White, Powers and Bona each testified to seeing blood 
appear on Loya's lips or mouth area immediately after Sucher's first 
reported swing. As Sucher exited the scene of Loya's disturbance, 
Loyafs body was rotated and he was then turned facedown to curtail 
his further spitting and struggling. After being turned facedown, 
he was carried toward his cell without further incident. After 
being carried facedown for a short distance, Loya requested to walk 
on his own and was allowed to do so. 
Meanwhile, Sucher, having released his hold on Loya's right leg, 
and having backed away following the spitting/punching episode, 
promptly left the scene to wash his face as Loya was being carried 
away to his cell. 
III. 
ISSUES 
The two interrelated issues placed before the hearing officer at 
Step 5 were: 
1. Was the Grievant dismissed for just cause? 
2. If not, what is the appropriate remedy? 
In his ultimate conclusion, the Board's hearing officer 
sustained the termination of Lieutenant Sucher as being supportea by 
just cause. 
Sucher, as Appellant at Step 6, now shoulders the burdens of 
proof and persuasion before the Board. Appellant's arguments to 
convince the Board that termination was not warranted in his 
circumstances include the following: 
1. The hearing officer erred in ruling that Sucher's conduct 
constituted either malfeasance or misfeasance, thus 
compelling consideration of additional evidence on the 
issue of self-defense to a threat of exposure to the AIDS 
virus. 
2. Substantial evidence was not present to show that Sucher struck the 
inmate. 
3. The hearing officer erred in not reversing or mitigating Sucher1s 
penalty of dismissal in light of the circumstances and in comparison 
with other disciplinary actions. 
Contained within argument number 1, above, Appellant offered a motion for 
the Board to consider new evidence bearing on the issue of whether a "bona 
fide fear of contracting AIDS [Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome] justifies 
the use of force against an inmate who is restrained by hano ana ankle 
cuffs." (Appellant's Brief, p. 1.) 
In light of the above arguments offered on Appellant's behalf, the Board's 
duty is to review the Step 5 Decision, including the record in its entirety, 
and to determine whether the hearing officer made accurate findings of fact, 
whether those factual findings have been correctly applied to the law, and 
whether the Step 5 Decision's conclusions of law are accurate and supportable 
by the adduced facts. These same findings and conclusions must rationally 
support the ultimate conclusion of law, i.e., the hearing officer's ruling. 
The scope of review is set forth in the Board's promulgated rules: 
Grievance Procedure Rules (1987), at p. 30: 
26.8 Standards of Review. The Board's decisions shall be 
based upon the following: 
26.8.1 The Board's appellate decisions shall be 
supported by credible substantial eviaence. 
26.8.2 The Board's standards of review consist of 
determining: (1) whether the hearing officer's 
evidentiary decision was supported by substantial 
evidence; (2) whether that decision is warranted by 
the facts and circumstances of the case on appeal; and 
(3) whether the hearing officer's Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law are correct and accurate based upon 
the evidence. 
After reviewing the evidentiary record in its entirety, the Board finds 
grounds for reversing the hearing officer with respect to Sucher's termination 
and modifies the evidentiary determination accordingly. 
IV. 
FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS 
A. Findings of Fact of Record. 
The parties jointly submitted a Stipulation of Facts document (Jt. Exh. 1) 
into the record prior to the evidentiary/Step 5 proceeding. That oocument 
contains 11 stipulated factual statements. 
The Board's trier of facts entered an additional 19 separate finaings of 
fact. The Board adopts all of these evidentiary factual findings and hereby 
incorporates them into this oecision. The Step 5 findings of facts are 
determined to be accurate and to have been correctly applied to the law. 
B. The Board's Findings and Analysis. 
The Board now enters the following five specific factual findings in 
support of its determination: 
1. Sucher's Proclaimed Fear of AIDS. 
We have determined that Appellant did, indeed, have a genuine 
subjective fear of AIDS being transmitted by Loya's saliva when it came 
into contact with his face. Inmate Loyafs saliva came into direct contact 
with Sucher's bare face. (Findings Nos. 13, 14, Step 5 Decision, 
pp. 3-4.) The reasonableness of Sucher's fear of catching the AIDS 
contagion through saliva landing on his facial area may not have been 
objectively appropriate. Nonetheless, Sucher had an immediate subjective 
fear of catching AIDS, which was manifested by his spontaneous utterance: 
"I'm charging you [Loya] with assault for a deadly weapon." (Sucher: 
T. Ill, p. 32, T. IV, p. 42; Moody: T. II, pp. 152-53; White: T. I, 
p. 150.) 
We further find, however, that Sucher was not singularly motivated by 
an interest in his self defense as he claimed, but that he lunged forward, 
swung at, and hit Loya in the mouth area with his fist as a retaliatory 
act for having been spit upon by the inmate. 
2. AIDS and Staff Training. 
Sucher did not receive appropriate training or adequate notice of how 
to properly respond to a situation in which an inmate — a potential 
AIDS-infected person or a suspected carrier with the condition of AIDS 
Related Complex, which is also referred to as ARC and Pre-AIDS —-
threatens to spit or otherwise transmit his saliva to the exposed skin of 
correctional staff. 
There was no showing of evidence that the Agency at any time 
previously offered training on the nature or prevention of AIDS to either 
Sucher or any correctional staff. (Blocker: T. I, p. 197; White: T. I, 
pp. 94, 159-60. White misstated that the subject AIDS memo was aaaressea 
to staff, rather than to inmates.) Neither was there a showing of any 
evidence that the Agency haa distributea any educational, instructional, 
or other training materials regarding the AIDS contagion to the 
correctional officers, such as Sucher. 
Appellant claimed to have found on the prison grounds an "Office 
Memorandum" addressed to "Utah State Prison Inmates," dated November 5, 
1985, and entitled "AIDS." (Mgt. Exh. 25.) Sucher stated that he haa 
read this brochure. (T. Ill, p. 135, T. IV, pp. 29-35) This brochure was 
addressed specifically to inmates. Sucher's acquisition of a copy was 
only through happenstance. 
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While the brochure states that, "There is no evidence that AIDS is 
spread by" sneezing, coughing, spitting or other kinds of common daily 
occurrences (Ibid., p. 2.), the brochure also advised that the risk of 
acquiring AIDS could be reduced by avoiding "the sharing of cigarettes, 
razors, toothbrushes, and manicure sets." (Ibid, p. 3.) Sucher recalled 
during the Step 5 proceedings that the brochure oirected to inmates also 
warned about the sharing of cigarettes, razors, toothbrushes, arinking and 
eating utensils, and the like. (T. Ill, p. 135, T. IV, pp. 30-31, 33, 37.) 
Sucher's fear of AIDS being contracted through saliva was genuine, 
and affected his actions on June 19, 1987, even if his fear was also 
misguided as well as unreasonable. Albeit the Agency did not show that 
proper training, orientation, or educational instruction regaraing AIDS in 
a custodial setting had been offered previous to the Loya incident. 
Consequently, Sucher was not properly trained or instructed on AIDS anent 
his inmate custodianship responsibilities, especially with respect to 
inmates spitting on correctional staff vis-a-vis AIDS. 
3. Sucher Used Unreasonable Force. 
Sucher's conduct of striking Loya in the mouth, in light of the 
totality of the circumstances, was not appropriate or reasonable, but 
rather his act of punching Loya constituted excessive force. In the 
totality of the circumstances, with inmate Loya confined by hanacuffs 
behind him and with leg irons securing his lower limbs, with three other 
correctional officers besides Sucher holding onto Loya's extremities, 
Sucher's act of retaliation to Loya's spitting by punching Loya's mouth 
was an application of unreasonable force. 
4. Sucher's Termination Constituted Excessive Discipline. 
In light of the Board's above-stated three findings, the hearing 
officer's conclusion that Sucher's termination was warranted fails to 
comport with the the Board's standard of review that the Step 5 decision 
must be "warranted by the facts and circumstances of the case on appeal." 
(Grievance Procedure Rules, 26.8.2.) The evidentiary examiner's 
conclusion and ruling was neither arbitrary nor capricious, just excessive 
anent the penalty in light of the totality of the facts and circumstances 
regarding the Loya incident. 
5. Sucher's Reliance Upon the Claim of Self Defense. 
Appellant asserted that his act of striking Loya subsequent to being 
spit upon was one of self defense. We do not agree. As stated in Finaing 
No. 1, above, Sucher committed an act of retaliation for having been spit 
upon in the facial area by Loya. Sucher1 s response of striking Loya was 
inappropriate because Sucher could have taken reasonable, alternative 
measures to prevent further spitting, and therefore possible further 
saliva contact, from Loya. These measures include, but are not limited 
to: turning aside, turning his back, ducking his head down, putting forth 
his hand as a block, stepping backwards and away, all of which stand in 
contrast to his having assaulted Loya with a physical blow of the fist. 
Considered in the total context of the Loya incident, Sucher1s act of 
punching Loya in the mouth was not the act that a reasonable person would 
take in the same situation. Thus, Sucher1s reliance upon a self defense 
claim is found to have been unreasonable, without merit, and wholly 
inappropriate as a response. 
V. 
LEGAL CONCLUSIONS 
The trier of facts entered the following specific conclusion of law: 
5. Discipline of a merit covered State employee must not 
be excessive, arbitrary or capricious. (Step 5 Decision, 
p. 5.) 
Subsequently, the Step 5 hearing officer made the following general ultimate 
legal conclusion: 
. . [T]hat Lieutenant Sucher1s conduct constituteo 
malfeasance and/or misfeasance . . . . [sic] (Step 5 
Decision, p. 16.) 
The Board legally concludes, pursuant to factual finding number four, 
above, that the Agency's dismissal of Sucher constituted excessively severe 
punishment in light of the record considered as a whole. The hearing officer 
performed a commendable task of setting forth accurate findings of fact. 
However, after a considerate review of the entire record, the Board makes a 
different ultimate legal conclusion than did the hearing officer. The penalty 
imposed on Sucher was excessive given the facts and circumstances of the Loya 
incident. Even though aggravating and mitigating factors have been previously 
raised and weighed at lower administrative levels, the Boara concludes that 
greater deference must be accoraed the fact that Sucher and other correctional 
staff had not been offered or received sufficient training on how to respond 
to spitting and saliva transmittal with respect to the AIDS contagion during 
inmate-correctional staff confrontations, such as the Loya inciaent. The 
record is absent any showing of training, education, and instruction offered 
by the Agency on the AIDS subject as applicable to its correctional officer 
staff. 
Based upon the Board's foregoing factual findings ana the just-noted legal 
conclusion, the Step 5 decision is vacated. Sucher is ordered to be returned 
to employment with the Utah State Prison and the Department of Corrections 
conditioned upon the remedy provided below. 
IV. 
DECISION AND REMEDY 
Based upon the Board's foregoing findings and ultimate conclusion, Sucher 
is ordered to be returned to full duty by the employing agency, the Utah State 
Prison, conditioned as follows: 
1. Sucher is to be returned to employment at the Utah State Prison in a 
Correctional Officer III position, or at a higher level if the Agency's 
administration prefers. His salary is to be reduced by ten percent from 
his former rate of $11.06 per hour, which he was earning on June 19, 1987. 
2. Sucher is to be returned to duty and placed on the Agency's payroll 
coincident to January 7, 1989, which is the beginning of a state payroll 
period. 
3. Sucher is not to be reinstated with back pay and benefits for the 
period from September 14, 1987 through January 7, 1989. 
4. Sucher shall not accrue annual leave, sick leave, or holiaay time 
during the period of his absence from September 1, 1987 through 
January 7, 1989. 
5. The period of absence from September 14, 1987 through January 7, 1989 
shall be treated as an administrative leave without pay, curing which no 
seniority accrues, nor does that time count toward the annual leave and 
sick leave accrual rates. 
6. Sucher's return to duty shall be at the discretion of management as 
to shift and duty assignments. 
7. This decision is to be a permanent document in Sucher's personnel 
file as maintained by the Agency. 
8. The Board retains jurisdiction over the above-stated remedy. Any 
disagreements or disputes regarding the interpretation or application of 
the above remedy, as well as over any need for additional clarification of 
the terms and conditions of employment arising from the application of 
this remedy, shall be resolved by the Board, if so petitioned, for as long 
as 90 days after issuance of this decision. 
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